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FOREWORD
NATO's enlargement will be perhaps the most important
defense and foreign policy issue of 1997. Certainly, its impact
will exert a decisive influence on the future evolution of
European security and the institutions that comprise it. This
process raises a host of serious issues concerning Europe, not
the least being the questions of what can or will be done for
those states who are not members of NATO or will not be able to
enter in the first round of enlargement. Other issues include the
impact of enlargement on NATO as an alliance system, on U.S.
foreign and defense policy, and on the European neutrals.
With these questions in mind, the Strategic Studies
Institute (SSI) and the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS) convened a roundtable in Washington on January 27,
1997. The chapters in this report originally were presented at
that roundtable. In publishing these papers SSI and CSIS offer
the substantive contributions of six expert authors to the
growing public debate over NATO enlargement. We hope that their
thoughtful work stimulates debate, and even action among our
readers as they grapple with this profound and complex question.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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OVERVIEW
Stephen J. Blank
When we think about European security, no question is more
basic or more complex than that of NATO enlargement. In July
1997, members of NATO will convene in Madrid and decide to invite
a number of Central and/or East European states to begin
accession talks with NATO, leading to their full membership in
1999. While it is not certain who the invited states will be,
there are good grounds for listing Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic as reasonable certainties. Slovenia and Romania are also
increasingly mentioned as possibilities. NATO's decision in
Madrid will have immense repercussions for Europe, not just for
NATO's current members, or for the new candidates, but also for
the states not invited. Those presumably include Russia, Ukraine,
Belarus, Bulgaria, Albania, the states emerging out of the former
Yugoslavia, and the European neutrals: Finland, Sweden, and
Austria, and the Baltic states. (See Figure 1.)
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Few have even thought about the consequences of the Madrid
decision for these states. Rather, the debate, such as it has
been, remains confined to an increasingly sterile discussion of
the pros and cons of enlargement, especially with reference to
supposed U.S. or Russian interests. Most of the public U.S.
statements, apart from those of the Clinton administration, have
been negative, as has been the almost unanimous Russian reaction.
While the debate has the virtue of forcing both sides to state
openly the premises of their policies; it also has led to a great
deal of polemics by partisans of both sides in the debate. Few
of those opposing NATO enlargement seem interested in discovering
and then analyzing what Russia wants in terms of European
security or what European states, either neutrals or aspirant
members, want from Western Europe and the United States.
Likewise, much of the discussion among those favoring enlargement
remains restricted to a discussion of NATO as a force for
democratic consolidation rather than an alliance for common
defense. That focus obscures many of the realities of
international affairs in today's Europe and tends to obscure the
hard questions of strategy and defense.
In order to explore the second and third order effects that
enlargement will have on European and North Atlantic security,
the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) convened a roundtable
in Washington, DC, on January 27, 1997. SSI and CSIS invited
analysts from several European states and American experts on
Central and Eastern Europe to analyze how enlargement will affect
U.S. policy, the face of European security, and the future of the
states that are likely not to be invited to join NATO in the near
future. This volume is a representative selection of the papers
presented at that roundtable.

Stephen Cambone demonstrates how the arguments in favor of
NATO's enlargement and their hidden premise that enlargement will
so stabilize Europe as to lessen demands on the United States to
be a security provider and to maintain a daily presence in
Central and East European affairs are misplaced. While Cambone
strongly favors enlargement, he rightly notes that its logical
next step is much greater and more detailed U.S. involvement, at
least politically, if not militarily, in Central and Eastern
Europe's new and expanded security agenda. As it is, Washington
is busy devising Baltic security programs, trying to lead
Bosnia's reconstruction, guaranteeing Ukraine's integrity, and
leading the negotiations with Moscow on all issues of European
security. The notion that enlargement means that collective
security has dawned in Europe and that the United States can
relax overlooks the fact that Washington, in order to maintain
and reaffirm its central position in Europe and to prevent a
renationalization of European security agendas, must become more
involved in these and other questions that are sure to arise
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after enlargement begins.
One area where the United States and NATO must become more
involved with Central and Eastern European candidates for NATO is
civil-military relations. As Jeffrey Simon indicates, NATO has
made democratization in this sphere a condition of membership,
and it will have to spend time and money to ensure that genuine
reforms are carried out and that new members and their militaries
can effectively take part in NATO's integrated military and
political planning. If they can do so then NATO benefits, as
well. But there is no magic wand for this issue, and it will be a
prominent part of whatever bill is presented to those states and
to Western taxpayers precisely because we have made
democratization the preeminent purpose of NATO in our public
rhetoric.
However, Russia neither believes that this is the main point
nor is it willing to accept any true improvement in Central
Europe's capacity for military defense. This is evident from the
current negotiations over a NATO-Russian charter, but it also
emerges from Leon Goure's discussion of Russian reactions to NATO
expansion. As Goure observes, Russian spokesmen view expansion–
they call it this and not enlargement–as essentially a sign of
NATO's betrayal of past accords and desire to shut Russia out of
European politics and its most effective security institution.
Russia views NATO as a hostile and unchanged military alliance
that is now moving up to Russia's borders. The problem with this
approach, as he rightly points out, is that it is only partly
true or one-sided.
As Goure demonstrates, Russia in 1997 offers little that is
positive for European security except for reproaches, which,
however justified, do nothing to enhance security and which, if
heeded, would substantially reverse the progress made for
everyone, including Russia, since 1989. This posture, if carried
to extremes, can create a lot of trouble in the neighborhood.
The key state in that neighborhood is, of course, Ukraine.
As Sherman Garnett points out, Ukraine has always felt itself
under the shadow of a Russian threat, and these fears, dating
back to Ukraine's inception as a state, are not unjustified.
Accordingly, Ukraine has sought Western support and has gradually
come to support NATO enlargement for other states as a way of
increasing its own security vis-a-vis Russia. Nevertheless, the
real challenges to Ukraine, which have not yet been met, are
internal. Its economy makes Russia's look strong, and its
government has persistently been unable to overcome corruption
and opposition to further reforms. The reign of the Nomenklatura
(former Soviet elites) continues unchecked in Kyiv (formerly
Kiev) and creates a huge obstacle to progress, reform, and
security. If Ukraine cannot overcome its internal problems, which
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make it more dependent on the Russian economy than is healthy for
it and could well exacerbate its problems with its Russian
minority, nothing NATO does for it or around it will make Ukraine
more secure. While Kyiv undoubtedly faces a security problem from
Russia, its real threats are homegrown ones.
Both the Russian and Ukrainian cases indicate that failure
to achieve democracy and meaningful political-economic reform add
to security problems in Central and Eastern Europe. Certainly
this is true as well for Slovakia. As Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright recently observed, the United States has
serious concerns about Slovakia's democratic progress. And as the
paper by Ambassador Theodore Russell demonstrates, these concerns
also affect other European states' perceptions of Bratislava's
fitness for NATO. Indeed, Slovakia has more than flirted with a
pro-Russian approach or an attempt to seek membership and support
Russian views on Europe's future security organization. This
uneven course has impressed no one in the West with Bratislava's
fidelity to democratization and willingness to solve its problems
with its Hungarian minority. Thus it is highly unlikely that
Slovakia will soon join NATO. Whatever the merits of its
nationality policy may be in fact, in practice that approach and
general government policy are perceived as being contrary to what
NATO wants to see. But the power to reverse this negative course
rests with Slovakia, and in time it can rejoin the processes of
European integration.
As Austrian Brigadier General Christian Clausen reminds us,
for the neutral states like Austria, the process of achieving
security through European integration is broader than mere
membership in NATO. It also includes the European Union (EU), to
which all these states also aspire. Nor will there be "a big
bang" when new members join either organization. The costs will
be high, and public opinion in all these states must rally round
the project for it to succeed. Thus we may expect a long and
gradual transformation which will not take place in neatly
separate but converging compartments. Rather, there will be
overlapping structures and functions in European security, even
as we move towards the long-hoped-for pacification of the entire
continent. Austria as a neutral state will not soon join NATO,
but as a member of EU, it is fully participating in the
Partnership for Peace and the EU's initiatives for a Common
Foreign and Security Policy that should greatly contribute to
European security.
These diverse views on European security and NATO's
transformation remind us that enlargement is in no way a simple
issue, but not only for us. It contains both great promise and
great complexities for Europe which must be realized through the
medium of individual governments by political means. Those are
rarely straightforward, and frequently consequences are not what
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were originally envisioned. Nonetheless, NATO has been an
indispensable element in the integration of a Transatlantic
security community, and, if it can realize a new vision through a
successful enlargement, it will continue to play that role for
many years.
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CHAPTER 1
THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT
Stephen A. Cambone
Introduction.
The upcoming NATO summit at Madrid in July 1997 will mark
the conclusion of a process to reform and enlarge NATO begun at
the Brussels summit in 1994. There, President Clinton led the
Alliance to a commitment to streamline its command structure,
establish a European pillar within NATO, and agree to provide the
European members of the Alliance with access to NATO staff and
assets and create Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). The 1994
summit also gave life to the Partnership for Peace (PfP). As
originally cast, the PfP was designed to encourage closer
relations between NATO members and the other states of the Europe
which was now defined as stretching from the Atlantic to the
Urals.
This package fit well with the overarching purposes of the
Clinton administration foreign and defense policy of the
"Europeanization" of NATO. By this policy, the administration
sought to increase the relative burden carried for Europe's
security by allies and, with the creation of the CJTF, make it
possible for the United States to "opt out" of Alliance
operations that Washington did not think it could justify at
home, while allowing it to put pressure on the allies to act on
their own behalf. Put another way, the "Europeanization" of NATO
would allow the United States to affirm its "Article V"
commitments to NATO while leaving the day-to-day responsibility
for European security with the allies.
With respect to the PfP, despite official protests from
Washington, it was viewed initially as a way to satisfy the
demands of Central European states for a security relationship
with NATO while aiding them in their efforts at internal reform
without actually opening the Alliance up to new members.
Washington's aversion to new members was driven less by concern
about the difficulties associated with incorporating them into
the Alliance than with the view of the Clinton administration at
the time that political and economic reform in Russia, and not
NATO enlargement, was key to the success of the Clinton security
policy. Absent "backsliding" in Russia or the development of a
"red-brown" coalition, senior administration officials were of
the view that a strategic partnership between the United States
and Russia was possible, and that it, in turn, could give life to
a new European architecture that would include all states and
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would not result in new lines being drawn in Europe.
This view was castigated for placing "Russia first," ahead
of the Central European states, in the definition of U.S.
interests and policy in Europe. But given the orientation of the
administration's security policy, it was a logically necessary
view. Former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin put it most
succinctly when he observed that a strategic partnership with
Russia made it possible to both reduce the defense budget and
improve the nation's economic security.1 Given the central
importance of the relationship with Russia, the administration
was loath to strain it unnecessarily by moving to incorporate new
states into NATO without first exploring the possibility that a
new security architecture could be constructed in Europe with
Russia as a full partner in that construction. Consequently, it
chose to temporize on the issues associated with membership by
Central European states.
That temporizing took two forms. The first was to avoid
casting the issue of NATO's relations with Central Europe in
terms of traditional security concerns. Instead, the
administration stressed that the PfP was designed as a way to
reinforce the trends toward political and economic reform,
enhance stability in the region, and build a collective security
community among European states. Classic formulations of the
geopolitical and geostrategic interests of states and alliances
were studiously avoided in discussing the future character and
content of the emerging European security space. The Alliance
played up its newly stated commitment to stress its role as a
political stabilizer and peacekeeper in Europe (vice its
traditional role of territorial defense). The combination of a
new NATO, the PfP, the growth and enlargement of the European
Union (EU) and the increased influence of the U.N. and
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) would
create, together with a new U.S. relationship with Russia, a zone
of peace in which the thought of war among its constituent states
would be unthinkable.
The second form of temporizing flowed from the first. After
having resisted for as long as possible giving a clear indication
of its commitment to expand the Alliance, the administration then
waited as long as possible to begin the process of enlargement.
The PfP, after all, was a response to the efforts of Europeans,
most prominently German Foreign Minister Volker Ruhe, to open the
Alliance to new members. As noted, the PfP received formal
sanction at the Brussels summit of January 1994.2 While it is the
case that the President declared later that month in Prague that
NATO enlargement was a matter of when it would happen, not
whether it would occur, the administration refused to agree to
extend formal invitations for nearly 3 years, until December
1996.3 This temporizing can be attributed to a number of causes,
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but the course of U.S.-Russian relations is the most obvious. In
the December 1993 Duma elections, President Yeltsin's faction was
dealt a blow from which it has yet to recover as nationalists and
other less reform-minded factions gained the majority. Throughout
1994 and into 1995, Yeltsin was fighting to hold onto the reform
process. At the May 1995 U.S.-Russian summit, it was agreed to
delay NATO enlargement until after the Russian and U.S. elections
of 1996.
That the United States could not temporize past 1996 was
signaled by the appearance of an August 1995 article entitled,
"Why NATO Should Grow" by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe
Talbott, the architect of the "Russia first" policy.4 Increased
domestic pressure for enlargement, brought on by Democrats
worried about creeping U.S. isolationism and a new Republican
congressional majority worried about the faltering progress of
Russian reform, combined with the inexorable strains created by
the enlargement process itself, accounts for the commitment to
explicit steps toward NATO enlargement rather than any
fundamental shift in the orientation of U.S. security policy.
This conclusion can be gleaned from the fact that the rationale
for enlargement has not altered significantly since January 1994,
Russia's role in the process of building the new European
architecture still dominates thinking on the subject, and the
Alliance is apparently prepared to accept conditions on the roles
to be played by the Alliance and its new members in European
security affairs--conditions being negotiated with Russia.
This short history brings us to the moment when the Alliance
will decide on enlargement. Whatever the rationale offered to
date, enlargement will have significant geostrategic and
geopolitical implications. This paper highlights those
implications. It begins with a brief discussion of the
administration's rationale for enlargement and the most telling
critique of it. The paper then discusses the implications of
enlargement for U.S. policy in Europe, concluding that despite
administration desires, NATO enlargement will require a sustained
and relatively deep American involvement in the day-to-day
security affairs of Europe. It then addresses the question of
Russian interests in light of these implications. It concludes
with a set of strategic criteria by which to judge the purpose
and value of NATO enlargement.
The Case for Enlargement.
The administration's case for enlargement has been of a
piece with its overall orientation on foreign and defense policy.
President Clinton, himself, gave the best expression of the
argument in his campaign speech in Detroit, Michigan, on October
22, 1996.5 In it, he blended the themes of domestic prosperity
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and security with those of foreign and defense policy that he had
been developing since before his first presidential campaign.6 He
replayed the theme that democracy and free markets are the best
base on which to build both domestic prosperity and security and
international peace and cooperation. He drew the image of a
collection of like-minded democratic states working together to
create an environment for the next century,
in which the blocks and barriers that defined the world
for previous generations will continue to give way to
greater freedom, faster change, greater communications
and commerce across national borders, and more profound
innovation than ever before; [it will be] a century in
which more people than ever will have the chance to
share in humanity's genius for progress.7
The President elaborated the point as follows:
Our prosperity as individuals, communities, and a
nation depends upon our economic policies at home and
abroad . . . Our well-being as individuals,
communities, and a nation depends on our environmental
policies at home and abroad. Our security as
individuals, communities, and a nation depends upon our
policies to fight terrorism, crime, and drugs at home
and abroad. We reduce the threats to people here in
America by reducing threats beyond our borders. We
advance our interests at home by advancing the common
good abroad.8
In times past one might have expected the President to
illustrate the last two lines with stories about our support for
freedom fighters opposing tyranny or the need for the United
States to stand firmly against the diminution of human rights in
repressive regimes. Instead, he immediately made reference to the
success of his trade policies in creating 10.5 million new jobs
in America, half of which were in high wage categories. This
success was due, among other things, to trade policies vis-a-vis
Japan. As a result of such policies, "real wages for the typical
working family have started to rise again for the first time in a
decade."9
From this the President concluded the following: "I say that
[the prior description of the results of trade policy] to make
the point that our economic policies at home and abroad affect
the well-being of America's families." But this linkage is not
confined to economic policy. Setting up his rationale for
American leadership in the world, the President went on to say:
"And in a world that is increasingly interconnected, we have to
just sort of take down that artificial wall in our mind that this
[i.e., a particular issue] is completely a foreign policy issue
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and this is completely a domestic issue because, increasingly,
they impact on one another." Knowing this to be the case, he
argued, it is incumbent on the United States to take the
leadership role in international affairs. According to Clinton,
that leadership must be expressed in two ways:
first, by meeting the immediate challenge to our
interests from rogue regimes, from sudden explosions of
ethnic, racial and religious and tribal hatreds from
short-term crises; and second, by making long-term
investments in security, prosperity, peace and freedom
that can prevent these problems from arising in the
first place, and that will help all of us to fully
seize the opportunities of the 21st century.10
Policy toward Europe, and NATO enlargement in particular, is
very much in keeping with this prescription for leadership. "I
came to office convinced," the President declared,
. . . that NATO can do for Europe's East what it did
for Europe's West: prevent a return to local rivalries,
strengthen democracy against future threats, and create
the conditions for prosperity to flourish. That's why
the United States has taken the lead in a three-part
effort to build a new NATO for a new era: first, by
adapting it with new capabilities for new missions;
second, by opening its doors to Europe's emerging
democracies; third, by building a strong and
cooperative relationship between NATO and Russia.11
The remainder of the speech
capabilities, declaring the
by 1999 and hoping that the
enlargement is not directed
into an agreement with NATO
security.12

was given over to describing the new
new members should be in the Alliance
Russians would understand that "NATO
at anyone" and would agree to enter
that assured them of their own

Reduced to its essentials, the President's case is less
about the need for expanding NATO than it is about the salutary
effect that a peaceful and prosperous Europe will have on affairs
in the United States. On this point there can be no argument.
What is not obvious from the President's discussion is why NATO
enlargement is the best vehicle for creating the desired peace
and prosperity.
This point has not been lost on commentators. The New York
Times put it this way in a lead editorial:
The Administration has dressed up its plans with
rhetoric about consolidating democracy and free markets
in the lands of the former Soviet empire, but has yet
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to make a good case why a cold-war military alliance,
rather than the European Union, is the best way to
secure those aims.
The more credible case for enlargement rests on more
practical principles, namely, maintaining a strong
American leadership role in Europe and preserving an
alliance that could defend against an aggressive and
militarily resurgent Russia in the future.13
But if The New York Times editorial board finds this a more
credible case, it is not a view that has persuaded a significant
segment of American opinion.14 Michael Mandelbaum, a professor of
American foreign policy at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies, touched off the latest round of discussion
on the issues with a fierce debate on NATO enlargement and its
merits with Richard Holbrooke, the putative father of NATO
enlargement policy in the United States, before the New York
Council on Foreign Relations.15 Mandelbaum's critique of
enlargement is straightforward and most telling: democracy needs
protection not in Central Europe but in Russia and Ukraine; if
the purpose of NATO enlargement is to reinforce democracy, why
aren't these two nations the leading candidates for membership?
On the present scheme, "the countries that need NATO," Mandelbaum
argues, "won't get it, and the countries that get it, don't need
it." If this were all that NATO enlargement entailed, it might be
a foolish but not harmful affair. But the "potential costs of
pushing ahead," in Mandelbaum's view, "dwarf the discomfort of
changing course." He warns that:
bitterness over NATO enlargement could turn Russia,
over the long term, against the entire post-Cold-War
settlement. That settlement, including the liberation
of Eastern Europe, the end of the Soviet Union and the
dramatic reduction in military force, is
extraordinarily favorable to the West. Russians respect
it because they agreed to every part of it. NATO
enlargement would be the first step in changing the
security arrangements of Europe taken against Russia's
wishes.16
With this critique, we come to face fully the real issue at
the bottom of NATO enlargement. Enlarging NATO is not about
increasing the family of democratic nations--although that could
be a benefit if it is properly conducted. Nor is it about
directly increasing the domestic well-being of Americans-increasing exports and creating high-paying jobs. It is first and
foremost about completing the settlement of post-Cold War
security issues in Europe. And that means it is about
establishing the basis for relations among states with vital
interests in the region--irrespective of the form of their
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domestic affairs--so that their competing and in some cases
contradictory interests do not give rise to crises and war.
Mandelbaum's warning about Russia's attitude is critical to
appreciating the strategic implications of NATO enlargement. He
reminds us that whatever a nation's attitude toward political and
economic reform, including ardent support for both, its national
security within the international system is not synonymous with
the creation of the conditions for advancing domestic security
among the constituent members of the system.
This reminder opens the opportunity for us to view NATO
enlargement in a way different from that which has been advanced
by the Clinton administration (and by extension the other members
of the Alliance). It allows us to view the issue from the
perspective of international relations rather than domestic
security and to assess whether NATO enlargement, on balance, is
more favorable to American interests than its alternative. It
also allows us to be far more straightforward in describing the
implications of NATO enlargement for the United States.
Strategic Implications of NATO Enlargement.
The enlargement of NATO will have five strategically
significant implications:
• First, because enlargement can take place only with the
support of the United States, an enlargement imposes a
responsibility on the United States to assure its success. This
means that it will have an interest in providing long-term
support and guidance to the newest members of the Alliance in
matters related to their security, to include their foreign and
defense policy.
• Second, it places NATO--and the United States--firmly in
the heart of Europe between Berlin and Moscow. This ought to have
the effect of assuring Germany that it will not be compelled to
take on responsibilities for European security that it is not yet
ready to assume nor that its neighbors--east or west--are willing
to grant. At the same time, it should assure Moscow that local or
regional instabilities will not be exported to Russia.
• Third, it would lend credibility to Western statements of
concern regarding the integrity and political independence of
Ukraine. Though the United States and others might wish to see
Ukraine remain independent, if it chooses to establish closer
ties to Russia, that is the business of the Ukrainian people. At
the same time, however, enlargement provides the Alliance with a
propinquity it would not otherwise have, allowing it to serve as
a deterrent to Russian pressure on Ukraine and a restraint on
Ukrainian practices.
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• Fourth, it provides a base for developing security
arrangements for the Balkans and the Baltics while the issue of
their inclusion in the Alliance is considered in the future. As
in the case of Ukraine, enlargement assures the Alliance of
direct strategic access to these regions in times of crisis.
• Fifth, by accomplishing the foregoing, enlargement can
relieve pressure on the EU enlargement process. The EU has a
considerable agenda today, including implementing the proposals
of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), addressing issues
associated with the creation of the European Monetary Union
(EMU), and beginning the negotiations on its own enlargement. In
light of these issues, it is unrealistic to expect the EU to
establish and conduct simultaneously a Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP) of a character and magnitude that it could
manage the full range of security issues in Central and Eastern
Europe. This is not to suggest that NATO enlargement should be
seen as a substitute for EU enlargement or that the EU should not
be encouraged to proceed with its own enlargement in an
expeditious matter. It is to suggest only that NATO enlargement
allows the EU to move with deliberate speed rather than with
haste with its own enlargement and, even more important to U.S.
interests, with the formulation of its CFSP.
These five implications suggest that enlargement will alter
substantially the context of security policy in Europe. NATO
enlargement will succeed in making the United States what it has
resisted becoming for its entire history: a European power.17 The
involvement of the United States in the affairs of both new
members and those still outside but bordering on the enlarged
Alliance (e.g., the Baltic states and Ukraine) will be far more
detailed and deeper than merely encouraging foreign investment or
negotiating basing rights for peacekeeping exercises. The fiscal
and monetary policies of these states, their domestic legal
systems, the size of their defense budgets and the structure and
posture of their military forces, and their negotiation positions
vis-a-vis one another and Russia on economic, territorial,
political, cultural, and ecological issues will be matters of far
greater interest to the United States than they have been in the
past. The era of benign American interest and "self-selection"
among states that marked the PfP for these nations will give way
to one of much closer partnership, with the United States holding
a far larger stake in the decisions by governments in these
regions.
This interest is only deepened by the fact that, by virtue
of enlargement, the United States will be the lead Central
European state. Toward it will flow--no matter how much it might
protest that other paths should be followed--the many issues
between West and East and related to the Baltics and Balkans,
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Ukraine and Belarus. The United States will be expected to
mediate trade and territorial disputes and to manage political
and cultural differences. Unlike Vienna, Budapest, Istanbul,
Moscow, and Berlin in the past, the United States in the future
will need to manage affairs in the cockpit of Central Europe-including, on occasion, the employment of military forces--with
an eye to maintaining a strategic equilibrium in the region, not
seeking to balance one power against another. This is an
infinitely more difficult task made necessary by the evident
desire to create a special relationship with Russia while
defending the sovereign rights and political interests of the
Central European states.
In taking on this role, the United States inevitably will
put itself at odds with the ambitions of the European Union.
While it is true that NATO enlargement might relieve some
pressure on the EU, it will nevertheless call into question among
EU states either the need for their own CFSP or the propriety of
American leadership in Europe on issues that are of vital
interest to Europeans. We have had a foretaste of how sharp such
a debate on the issue could become in the case of NATO's Southern
Command. The United States and France have taken nearly
irreconcilable positions on the question of whether it should
remain in U.S. hands or be placed in those of a member of the
"European pillar" of the Alliance. Thus, the United States must
add Brussels, and more importantly Paris, to the list of capitals
to which it must pay attention.
NATO enlargement will bring a substantial increase in
demands on the United States in political terms and potentially
in economic and military terms even if it is well handled. Viewed
from this more realistic perspective of strategic implications,
one is compelled to ask why the United States should invite these
demands.
The answer begins with the recognition of a truism: no postCold War settlement and new international system in Europe is
possible without the active participation of the United States.
Europe is not unique in this regard. The same can be said with
respect to the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Northeast Asia.
We take it for granted that it is true for North and South
America. There is some debate whether it is true for Central and
South Asia and for sub-Saharan Africa.
But to say this is only to admit the essential role of
American power--political and economic as well as military--in
the calculations of states in these regions relative to their own
interests. The United States hardly has a need to go about the
world seeking allies and friends. Apart from those who have an
ideologically-based hostility to the United States and those who
view us as direct competitors, most nations of the world freely
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seek U.S. favor as a means of promoting their domestic situation,
their regional prospects, and their international influence. For
its part, the United States welcomes and appreciates the
contributions made by its allies and friends to the promotion of
an international system in which the United States can prosper
both at home and abroad.
If America's role in Europe is not unique, Europe is a
region whose stability and security is nevertheless essential to
any hope American statesmen might have for creating and
maintaining a strategically viable and politically acceptable (at
home and abroad) global international system.18 The reasons are as
simple as they are profound. American political and economic
interests in Europe, the political and economic interests of our
European allies and friends in America, and those of America and
Europe elsewhere in the world have become inextricably
intertwined over nearly a century of close cooperation. But it is
not the relative closeness of interests that is so critical as
the fact that, in combination, the United States and Europe
generate irresistible power--political, economic and military--on
the world scene.
This power can be dissipated by instability on the European
continent. It has taken nearly 50 years for the continent to
regenerate its power after the end of World War II. During those
50 years the United States managed, at a cost that increased over
time, to sustain a reasonably stable, bipolar international
system while promoting and protecting Europe's recovery. Now that
the continent has recovered and the international system is
becoming increasingly complex, the United States has an interest
in seeing that instability does not recur in Europe. But this
interest is rooted in more than a determination to discourage the
diversion or dissipation of Europe's power in the belief that it
can be harnessed more broadly to America's interests. More
fundamental is the fact that insecurity and instability on the
continent will inevitably threaten U.S. vital interests.19
The American interest in Europe is two-fold. The first is to
encourage the further development and protection of Europe's
power. To repeat, this power is not only economic and military,
but political as well. The United States can promote the
development of European power in the confidence that it will be
wielded by nations that share a commitment to the policies and
politics of modern liberal states. Hence, while European economic
power may compete with American business and financial interests,
its liberal states, irrespective of their military power, pose no
threat to U.S. well-being. The second American interest in Europe
follows from the first: to deter the rise of a hegemonic power on
the continent. A European hegemon can arise only in opposition to
the liberal policies and politics of its neighbors; policies and
politics to which all states in the region, including Russia, are
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attempting to adapt and institutionalize. In short, it would need
to be a revolutionary or revisionist state. Hostility to the
principles of equality and freedom would render that state, by
its own definition, an ideological enemy of the United States.
And, undoubtedly possessed of the economic and military means of
waging modern warfare, such a hegemon would be capable of
physically destroying the United States. These two interests come
together in NATO; an enlargement of NATO advances both interests
proportionately.
Why NATO Enlargement?
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been and will
continue to be the institution through which the United States
can best pursue its interests in Europe. The reason for this is
not surprising. NATO is the only intergovernmental organization
in Europe in which the United States is recognized as the lead
nation. The United States is not a member of the EU or the
Western European Union (WEU). It is one of many in the OSCE and
Council of Europe. The G-7 has a broader portfolio and is, in any
case, becoming increasingly less relevant. Likewise, the World
Trade Organization has a wider mandate. NATO is the only
organization in which the political and military dimensions of
European power--and to a lesser though not insubstantial degree
its economic power--come together in a way that they can be
combined with that of the United States. To repeat, that power
when combined is irresistible. Hence, from an American
perspective, NATO should be the institution in the forefront of
the creation of a new security system in Europe.
At present, no other institution in Europe is prepared to
take the lead in creating a post-Cold War settlement. This is not
a matter of will among the European allies, as some Americans
might argue, but one of timing and scale. In the case of the
European institution most frequently cited as the preferred
alternative to NATO, the EU, it needs to be recalled that the
Maastricht treaty, creating the EU, was signed only 5 years ago
(1992). Europe is still organizing itself. A CFSP, supported by a
well-organized political and economic structure capable of
reflecting and pursuing the interests of the EU, is more than a
decade away. A competent military organization to support a CFSP
is at least as distant. The members of the EU, and most
importantly France and Germany, are only now beginning to
redesign and equip their armed forces to bring them up to 21st
century standards. In short, the EU will not be in a position to
assume fully the responsibility for Europe's day-to-day security
for a decade, perhaps as many as two.
In the meanwhile, Russia will do what it can to muster the
resources of the nation and bring them to bear on European
politics. If history is any guide in the matter, this will be no
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mean effort. In the absence of offsetting political and military
power, it is difficult to imagine that Russia would voluntarily
constrain its interests. This observation is not driven by any
abiding suspicion of Russian motives or the character of its
people. It is merely a recognition of the enormous stake Russia
has in assuring that its interests are satisfied. Three times in
this century alone, Russia has recovered from the ravages of war
or domestic revolution and internal repression (1917-21; 1937-39;
1945) and each time proved itself more than capable of pursuing
its interests and influencing events on the continent. There is
no reason to believe that Russia's people will be content to
consign their country to the status of a second ranking power in
Europe when they are as able as we are to read and appreciate
their own history and potential.
Hence, what we can reasonably expect--that it will take
Europe more than a decade to establish itself and during that
time Russia is likely to assert its interests in Europe--leads to
the conclusion that security and stability will be established in
Europe only with active U.S. involvement. The difficulty rests
less with the desire that Russia should be part of the new
system, but with the inability of the EU to successfully create
that system in the region. That is, if methods are to be found to
recognize Russian interests in Europe and to make a place for it
in Europe's security architecture, the United States must
continue to play an active role in the day-to-day security
affairs of the continent. Europe cannot handle Russia alone.
American power is essential to the equation. Its power is needed
not in a traditional "balance of power" sense--putting in just
enough to bring European power up to Russian standards or to
encourage Russian development to offset European ambitions.
American power is needed as an essential element in the creation
of a strategic equilibrium in the new security system.
Viewed from this perspective, the case for the United States
taking on an active role in European security affairs is
compelling. The argument rests on a simple strategic calculation.
Today and into the future, the United States faces increased
requirements to deploy and employ its political, economic and
military resources outside of Europe. In comparative terms, these
requirements--from the Middle East and Southwest Asia to the subcontinent and on to Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia--are driven
by conditions far more intractable than those facing the United
States and its allies in Europe. It makes eminent good sense for
the United States to work hard now to establish an equilibrium in
Europe while such an endeavor might prove easiest, rather than to
wait for a future time.
Time is only going to see additional difficulties develop
elsewhere for the United States. As the President's spring 1996
trip to Asia demonstrated, and as subsequent events have
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indicated, the United States has a long-term strategic challenge
vis-a-vis China. Quite apart from the political and economic
challenge presented by China, in the aftermath of the Taiwan
contretemps the United States must now take seriously the
military dimension as well. In Southeast Asia, the reemergence of
Vietnam and the determination of Indonesia to enter the ranks as
an emerging regional power changes the strategic landscape
considerably.20 As a result, the United States has already
undertaken, among other measures, to rework its alliance with
Japan and to update its relations with Australia. In South Asia,
the competition between Pakistan and India will not end any time
soon. A new "great game" is afoot in Central Asia. The Middle
East peace remains fragile.
The United States has no alternative but to address these
and other issues in these regions. Its economic future depends on
it; its political credibility requires it. And in so doing, it
contributes indirectly to stability in Europe. For there is no
question that events abroad affect affairs in Europe. The Chinese
Foreign Minister's efforts to play the "Euro-card" during his
spring 1996 negotiations with the United States on trade and
Taiwan is one example; the crisis in the Middle East the same
spring (prior to the Israeli elections) when U.S. and European
statesmen tripped over each other seeking a cease-fire in
southern Lebanon is another. The effort of the United States to
conduct its dual containment policy of Iran and Iraq is another
example, as is U.S. policy toward Cuba.
From the perspective of its broad strategic interests, the
United States could conserve its resources for application
elsewhere if it were to help design and maintain an enduring
political system in Europe, even if that system were to require a
continued day-to-day commitment to European security through an
enlarged NATO. Creating a new European security system via NATO
expansion directly raises Mandelbaum's point that Russia must be
a founding member of the new European security system. The
current approach to NATO enlargement never directly meets the
point. The argument, oft-made in the United States but repeatedly
rejected by Moscow that NATO enlargement is in the interest of
all the states of Europe except Russia, fails Mandelbaum's test.
Russia has put forward its own formulation on European security.
It maintains that security in Europe cannot be assured until its
interests in Europe are formally recognized by NATO and
individual allies via a legally binding agreement.21
The Russian case needs to be considered before its
objections can be met. The centerpiece of Russia's interest is
political rather than military or territorial. Russia's position
amounts to an insistence that it be accorded the status of a
member of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) while retaining its
position as an independent strategic actor on the Eurasian
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landmass. There is nothing extraordinary in this ambition and
nothing illegitimate, in principle, with the Russian interest. It
is after all, when stated so baldly, not much different than the
American interest outlined above.
But the issue for the United States and its allies is not
the legitimacy of Russian interest. The issue is the level of
confidence they can have in the purposes to which such status
would be put and the objectives Moscow would pursue on the
Eurasian landmass. The question is particularly keen because for
the moment, at least, the allies have it within their power to
advance or retard Moscow's ambitions and interests. Thus, for the
Alliance, the issue reduces itself to a question: Will
recognizing Russia--in the sense described by Moscow--render
Russia more or less likely to be a congenial partner in a postCold War European security system?
The earlier discussion might lead to the conclusion that the
risks associated with admitting Russia as a founding member would
be more than off-set by the deeper commitment to European
security made by the United States as a result of enlargement.
But unlike the arguments for equilibrium outlined above, this
less sophisticated form of "balancing" is as likely to create new
lines in Europe as would a decision not to grant Russian demands.
The difference is that by admitting Russia to the NAC, lines
would appear around the table of the NAC rather than on a map. Of
the two possible ways the lines might be drawn, the former is the
more dangerous for the Alliance. Substantial differences on
policy or operations could transform the Alliance from an engine
of reform and stability into a moribund organization as Moscow
exercised an actual or virtual veto. To be sure, tension between
the Alliance and a Russia that is outside the NAC could create
internal tensions as well. But at the limit, the difference is
that in such cases Moscow would not have direct means of
preventing Alliance action and therefore influencing the
formulation of its policy.
These concerns, however, have merit only if there is
substantial reason to lack confidence in Russia's purposes and
objectives. On this point, it is hard to credit the case that
Russia has committed itself to the principles guiding NATO
enlargement as they apply either to internal governance or to the
conduct of international relations. Beginning with the assault on
the Russian White House in October 1993 and the purge of
reformers from the government in early 1994, the Russian
government has become progressively less cooperative in its
policies in an effort to retain its authority and to preserve its
status vis-a-vis the Duma on the domestic front. While economic
reform continues, there is still little evidence that the economy
has been put on a sound footing, that the looting of functioning
industries by managers and government overseers has ended, or
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that credible measures have been taken to provide workers in
state industries with their back pay.
Alexander Lebed's showing in the first round of the 1996
election, his subsequent deal with President Yeltsin to withdraw
from the second round in return for the post of security advisor,
and, finally, his dismissal suggest that the electoral process is
anything but regular. But as troubling as that may be, of greater
concern is what it suggests about the internal instability among
political elites concerning the direction of the country in both
policy and programmatic terms. While the communist party may have
been eliminated as a viable contender for the public's support,
no other party or policy direction has emerged with even modest
evidence of public approval. The increasingly public display of
dissatisfaction and disaffection with President Yeltsin could set
up an opportunity for the Russian people to return to the polls
in the near future to give a more clearly defined mandate for
government. But the potential for such an outcome, or that the
mandate will give life and direction to a substantial reform
movement, must be weighed against the manner of President
Yeltsin's passing--by political or natural causes--and the extent
to which those responsible for the current state of affairs will
be able to control the electoral process to their own benefit.22
The seriousness of internal disarray in Russia can be
appreciated through many examples. One of the most telling,
however, is the case of the Russian contribution to the
international space station. Collaboration on the space station
is the centerpiece of U.S.-Russian cooperation not only in space,
but in science and in the preservation of high technology
research, development, and industry in Russia. The effort is
overseen by Vice President Al Gore and Prime Minister
Chernomyrdin. The former is the lead voice in the United States
on science and space; the latter is the functional head of Russia
and arguably its most powerful factional leader. Neither the
prestige of the first nor the power of the second has been
sufficient to keep Russia's participation on schedule. The recent
U.S. decision to substitute U.S. components for those Russia has
failed to provide is a serious blow to Russia. It is in no sense
a fatal blow, but it does demonstrate that the Russian system is
bordering on collapse if it cannot deliver on one of its highest
prestige projects in the sector of science and industry, an area
in which it was once a world leader.
Despite its evident difficulties, Russia continues to pursue
a foreign policy that belies its internal weakness. This includes
unceasing efforts to use the forum and agreements of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to reintegrate the
political and economic forces of the old USSR under Moscow's
control.23 Russia has reinserted itself into the politics of the
Middle East, the Caucasus, and Southwest Asia. It continues to
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take a proprietary interest in Central Asia. And it is attempting
to forge a rapprochement with China, built around border
agreements, nonaggression pacts, military cooperation, and trade
pacts.24 From a U.S. and NATO point of view, there is nothing
sinister in these efforts, per se. What is uncertain is how far
Russian objectives in these regions coincide with those of the
allies, and particularly those of the United States. On recent
evidence, this does not appear to be the case. Foreign Minister
Primakov has sought to balance U.S. influence in the Middle East
peace process and asserted an interest by Moscow in restoring
historic relations with both Iraq and Iran. In Central Asia,
Russia has done all that it can to assure that states there
depend on it for the exportation and transportation of their
natural resources to Western markets. Russian spokesmen are
straightforward in their warning that if their interests are not
met in Europe, they will have no choice but to forge closer ties
with China in an effort to isolate the United States from the
rest of the continent outside Europe.
With respect to Europe itself, the Foreign Minister's
statements that the borders of the states created since the fall
of the Soviet Union are not guaranteed by the Helsinki
agreements25 gives rise to concern not only for the states of the
Baltic region, but also for the status of Belarus and Ukraine as
seen from Moscow.26 Demands that any agreement reached with NATO
be ratified not only by Alliance members and Moscow, but by the
states of the CIS suggest that Russia is seeking to establish a
balance of legally constituted entities with legally established
rights and privileges vis-a-vis one another. In this light,
demands for a renegotiation of the Conventional Forces in Europe
Treaty (CFE), for NATO assurances that Alliance forces not be
stationed on the territory of new members, and for the sides to
affirm their nonaggressive attitude and status can be interpreted
as an effort by Moscow to render moot the potential of NATO
enlargement. Put another way, it would effectively relegate new
members to second-class status in the Alliance, able to
participate in the NAC and even, perhaps, in the Military
Committee and integrated command, but without the freedom to
develop their defense relations with the Alliance--and the
Alliance with them--in ways best calculated to deter Russian
policy and to defend themselves in times of crisis.
Russia's willingness to play the nuclear card in its effort
to gain its objectives is a sign of both its relative weakness
and its determination. Of the two, the latter is more important.
Moscow's willingness to talk openly of relying more heavily on
its strategic rocket forces and its tactical nuclear arms to
offset Western power, its decision to make further reductions in
offensive forces under the START II agreement an element of its
negotiating strategy, and its hints of cooperation in nuclear
matters with China and possibly North Korea suggest that this is
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a very high-stakes matter from Russia's point of view. Nuclear
diplomacy was thought to have been laid to rest in 1991 when
Presidents Bush and Yeltsin embarked on unilateral reductions and
concluded START I and II. To revive it now, especially after the
United States has made the denuclearization of its own military
policy and of international diplomacy one of the hallmarks of its
defense and foreign policy is to risk a return to the conditions
that led to the collapse of the USSR.27
On balance, then, U.S. and allied leaders have to consider
whether or not the safety and security of the European system is
better served with Moscow as a fully participating member from
the beginning. To decide in the negative is not to decide to
isolate or ignore Russia--neither is possible in any case. But a
negative decision means that if a charter is forged between NATO
and Moscow, it must not grant prerogatives to Moscow that
effectively undermine the purposes of enlargement. The broader
the agenda of issues on which Brussels grants Russia a right to
coordinate decisions and actions, the closer Moscow comes to
achieving its objectives and the less likely it becomes that
enlargement will serve American interests.
It would seem that the significance of a charter agreement
with Russia would encourage the Alliance to apply to Russia the
same criteria it applies to new members--commitments to economic
and political reform, transparency in military affairs, an end to
border disputes, etc. Russia would not pass for membership on
these criteria; any recognition accorded its interests by NATO
via a charter should take this into account. Enlargement seeks to
assure that no hegemon will arise in the future to threaten
Europe and the United States. Russia remains the only state in
Europe able to achieve that status and the only one with domestic
and international policies that give concern to other European
powers. A charter should not substitute for membership in either
figurative or literal terms.
Conclusion and Summary.
The thesis being put forward is that the accession of states
in Central Europe to NATO, complemented by the development of
security arrangements affiliated with NATO through the PfP or WEU
and followed as appropriate by EU enlargement is the best
approach to establishing a post-Cold War security system in
Europe and for creating a strategic equilibrium that includes
Russia.
The reasons for this derive from the purpose behind an
American commitment to equilibrium in Europe: to assure that all
states have the opportunity to prosper and in which a recourse to
aggression and war would require a revolutionary change in an
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aspiring hegemon and serve as a catalyst for uniting the
remaining states in opposition. The rationale for the enlargement
of the Alliance outlined here meets each of these criteria in
turn.
With respect to the opportunity of states to prosper, the
approach outlined here is aimed at taking nearer-term pressure
off the EU to provide security assistance to the Central and
Eastern Europeans. This should permit the EU to concentrate on
getting its internal house in order. This includes not only the
implementation of recommendations from the IGC, but a process for
developing and implementing a CFSP. At the same time, NATO
enlargement allows the Alliance to counsel its newest members and
PfP participants as they rationalize their own economies and
budgets. It is in Europe's interest to encourage them to
emphasize butter over guns when considering both the absolute
ratios between these two and where to spend the marginal dollar.
NATO enlargement will make these states more receptive to this
encouragement.
As for setting conditions that would require revolutionary
change in an aspiring hegemon before it embarked on aggression,
NATO enlargement provides assurance to both Russia and the
allies. For Russia, enlargement creates an interest in the
Alliance as a whole to restrain the practices of its members and
itself corporately such that neither individual members nor
NATO's broad policy gives rise to activities that can be
interpreted in Russia as being aggressive. For the allies, it
codifies the principles of national sovereignty, political
independence, and territorial integrity as the basis for peace
and stability in Europe. It gives strength to the principles
first articulated in Helsinki.
These principles are essential components of the foundation
of a modern, liberal state. As such, they are important to
Russia. Apart from an appeal to force or prerogative, they
provide the only basis on which Russia can hope to successfully
press its security interests in Europe with the other powers on
the continent. For Russia to accept NATO enlargement would not be
an act of humiliation, but an indication that it has taken a
further step in the long process of liberalizing its regime and
establishing normal relations with its neighbors.
Finally, NATO enlargement satisfies the last criterion:
setting the conditions for others to react if an aspiring hegemon
should emerge, clearly. This is consistent with the liberal
principles of sovereignty, independence and integrity, supported
by the right of self-defense. No arrangement for Central and
Eastern Europe can be a lasting one if it leaves this last
principle in doubt.

18

The "Europeanization" of Europe's security is a long-term
goal. Its possibility rests on the establishment of a stable
security system in Europe. This system depends on the creation of
a strategic equilibrium. That equilibrium, in turn, depends on
the presence and active participation of the United States in the
day-to-day security affairs in Europe. A nearer-term American
investment in an enlarged NATO will not only assure that U.S.
vital interests are protected in Europe, but provide the United
States with the strategic flexibility it will need to secure its
interests, vital or otherwise, elsewhere in the world.
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CHAPTER 2
POST-ENLARGEMENT NATO:
DANGERS OF "FAILED SUITORS" AND NEED FOR A STRATEGY
Jeffrey Simon
NATO has been grappling with the issue of enlargement since
the Central and East European (CEE) Revolutions of 1989-90 when
newly-emerging post-communist states declared their desire to
"return to Europe."1 This meant joining NATO and the European
Union (EU). NATO's initial response at the July 1990 London
Summit was to extend a "hand of friendship" and invite members of
the Warsaw Pact to send liaison ambassadors to NATO.2 As a result
of the September 12, 1990, Four-plus-Two agreement, the former
German Democratic Republic unified with Germany on October 1 and,
as such, became a member of NATO and assumed the protection of
Article 5.3
During 1991-93, CEE pressures to join NATO increased as the
situation in Europe began to change and become more complex.
Change was evident as military forces from the former Soviet
Union continued to withdraw from Germany;4 and on July 1, 1991,
the last Soviet forces departed Hungary and Czechoslovakia and
the Warsaw Pact disappeared. In November 1991 at the Rome Summit,
NATO responded by creating the North Atlantic Cooperation Council
(NACC) as a framework for dialogue on security issues among
Alliance members and CEE.5 As of January 1992, the situation
became more complex in Europe when more than 20 new states were
created after the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia disintegrated. The
NACC, which originally had been envisioned to have six members,
immediately accepted all former Soviet Union states, so that by
the spring of 1992 there were 23 NACC participants, which
effectively limited its utility.
Despite some public utterances in Prague, Bratislava, and
Warsaw in August 1993 implying support for NATO enlargement,
President Boris Yeltsin expressed alarm in a so-called "secret
letter" in September, making it quite clear that Russia had come
to view NATO enlargement to the East as a threat to Russian
security interests.6 In what many Central Europeans saw at the
time as a "Policy For Postponement," the January 10-11, 1994,
Brussels NATO Summit initiated "Partnership For Peace" (PfP) and
declared that NATO was committed to future enlargement.7
The Tightening Enlargement Decision Schedule.
Continued Central and East European pressure on the Alliance
led to the December 1, 1994, North Atlantic Council (NAC)
ministerial decision to commission a study on the "how" and "why"
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of enlargement.8 The April 1995 Noordwijk NAC ministerial
reviewed the study draft and in September the Study On NATO
Enlargement was briefed to partners.
The December 1995 NAC ministerial launched enhanced 16+1
dialogues with those partners who were interested in joining the
Alliance.9 Initially, 15 (of 27) partners expressed interest in
commencing 16+1 discussions. In the end, though, two partners-Ukraine and Azerbaijan--never participated. Two other partners-Finland and Bulgaria--who participated in the dialogues,
concluded that they would "not seek immediate membership." Eleven
partners, who participated in the three rounds of intensified
dialogues between April and October 1996, expressed interest in
joining the Alliance "immediately." The pool of potential "failed
suitors" comes from the diverse group of 11 partners--Poland,
Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia; Romania and Slovenia;
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia; Albania and the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)--who are not offered invitations in
July 1997.
While the June 1996 Berlin NAC ministerial received a report
on the ongoing consultations and addressed enhanced cooperation
with partners,10 the December 1996 NAC ministerial--in addition to
European "visibility" and post-Implementation Force (IFOR)--built
on Secretary General Javier Solana's assessments of the 16+1
dialogues, and announced that the Alliance would actually invite
new members at the July 1997 Madrid Summit.11
Planning for managing NATO enlargement will become priority
business during 1997 in the buildup to the Madrid Summit. In what
is likely to become a tightening enlargement decision schedule,
during the winter and spring 1997 NATO will need to determine
"whom" to invite and, although the 50th anniversary of NATO has
been mentioned by President Clinton, "when" they should join.
Managing NATO's enlargement process--particularly in
defining the criteria so as to justify the choice of new members,
to prevent destabilizing the "failed suitors," and to keep them
engaged in PfP--will be a major challenge! In other words, NATO
faces the danger of creating "failed suitors" and derailing the
PfP process. In addition, defining and managing NATO's
relationship with Russia and Ukraine will be demanding.
Partnership for Peace:

From January 1994 to Post-Enlargement.

Since PfP's inception at the January 1994 Brussels Summit,
NATO has reoriented its outreach programs and developed new
institutions to manage the partnership program. Despite initial
reservations on the part of many CEE states, who had hoped for an
early enlargement decision, and the fact that initially PfP was
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only an embryonic concept, PfP has become a very popular and
successful program. Open to all Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) members, in just 3 years a widely
diverse 27 countries--from the former Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia, non-Soviet Warsaw Pact, and neutrals--have adopted
PfP.
After signing PfP Framework Documents outlining broad policy
goals and objectives, 22 partners developed presentation
documents, which identified their PfP objectives (e.g., whether
they seek NATO membership or only cooperation). Individual
partnership programs (IPPs) were developed to help the partner
meet its specific presentation document objectives. In addition,
NATO developed a Partnership Work Program (PWP) listing NATO
activities that partners could use to fulfill their own IPPs,
and has now initiated a 3-year planning cycle for IPPs.
As the partnership program evolved, a Planning and Review
Process (PARP) was also established to help (now 15) partners
adopt NATO-compatible methods and procedures and develop
interoperability for peacekeeping, search and rescue, and
humanitarian assistance operations.12 To prepare partners for
deploying the IFOR, the December 1995 NAC broadened the January
1994 Brussels Summit terms of reference to include "peace
enforcement measures."13 Presently, the PARP includes 20
interoperability objectives (I.O.s) and might be viewed as a
mini-defense planning questionnaire (DPQ) that current NATO
members must provide to NATO.
NATO's new institutions to implement PfP on a day-to-day
basis have gone far beyond the NACC initially created in 1991. In
1994, NATO created a Political-military Steering Committee (PMSC)
to manage PfP programs and develop the PWP and IPPs. A separate
Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) was established at Mons, near
SHAPE headquarters, to coordinate military activities of (now 21)
partners with NATO. The PCC helps partners identify and fulfill
military training and exercise requirements to develop
interoperability with NATO. Efforts have been occurring through
numerous PfP and "in the spirit of PfP" exercises that have
expanded since 1994 and with the deployment of the IFOR since
December 1995.
Though the PfP program and activities have been remarkably
successful, we have reached a new stage where its activities need
to be carefully evaluated and substantially improved in order to
accelerate partner reforms and preparation for membership. To
date, PfP military exercises have been judged successful just
because they occurred. It is now time, though, to realistically
assess partner capacities in PfP exercises. We need to honestly
address partner deficiencies in NATO procedures as well as in
general performance standards. We cannot continue to gloss over
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these out of concern for embarrassing partners. They know
deficiencies exist, and we know they exist. By glossing them
over, we discourage partners' internal reforms. The same applies
for their IFOR participation. This means that NATO needs to
establish training and performance standards and to critically
evaluate them.
In sum, PfP has been remarkably successful, but the time has
arrived for developing rigorous criteria for partners' political
compatibility and military interoperability to encourage needed
reforms and to prepare partners for accession to the Alliance. In
the buildup to July 1997, the criteria will be needed to justify
NATO's decision to the "failed suitors" in order to keep them
engaged in PfP.
From Uncertain Criteria to Military Interoperability Objectives.
Partners and NATO have sought to establish a foundation for
linking force goal planning and operational interoperability as a
precondition for full NATO membership. In essence, operational
interoperability simply means assessing the partner's ability to
carry out operations with NATO and participate in NATO's command
and control structure. First, a partner's ability to carry out
operations with NATO can be measured by comparing a partner's
ground, sea, and air training with NATO's standards. Of the
approximately 1,500 NATO Standardized Agreements (STANAGS), about
700 have been released for use by the partners.
Second, a partner's ability to operate within NATO's command
and control structure requires several necessary conditions.
First, it requires adequate language training. Second, it
requires education and training of specific "target groups." Each
partner needs an adequate number of staff and liaison officers
and functional area officers to work in a NATO multinational
headquarters, and trained commanders and staffs of partner units
that will operate within a NATO multinational formation. Third,
partners need a minimal technical interoperability in
communications and command and control.
Considerable progress was registered in 1994-95 through
implementation of three approaches: (1) the PfP planning and
review process which promised a high degree of transparency in
defense planning and budgeting; (2) the IPP which stated the
individual partner's requirements; and (3) the PWP which outlined
what NATO and the specific allies had to offer for partner
participation. All three processes are intended to establish a
dialogue on force requirements and planning.
Unfortunately, the PWP and IPPs initially evolved into
"activities-oriented" rather than "objectives-oriented"
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mechanisms. As one commentator noted, PWP and IPP seek
essentially to "fill the basket" with guesses as to what are
likely to prove appropriate partner "activity."14 In part, because
of uncertain criteria, NATO guidance has been minimal, with NATO
inquiring of partners through the IPP "what do you want to do"
and the latter responding via the PWP "what do you have to
offer?"
Despite these early deficiencies, during 1996 the PfP
program made very substantial progress in defining I.O.s.
However, the program remains at a plateau where partner nations
badly need in-depth guidance on interoperability and force
planning. Many partners find that they are at a disadvantage
given their limited access to classified NATO documents; those
few made available offer little guidance on priorities and
conceptual approaches relevant to partner planning needs. NATO's
attempts to provide needed guidance have yielded 20 approved
I.O.s which are too generalized, and thus offer little promise of
significant progress in meeting NATO's 44 I.O.s.
On balance, many partners increasingly find existing
mechanisms and channels of available information disconnected,
bureaucratically burdensome, and problematic as to the provision
of meaningful criteria by which to measure their progress.
However, there is some expectation of progress with development
of a Bi-MNC Directive for Peace Support Operations which provides
a foundation for the development of education, training, and
military exercise activities. Within the same framework,
interoperability requirements and tasks are being developed for
air, land, and maritime forces. Also within NATO, recognition is
growing that the PARP should provide the basis for achieving
political compatibility in light of potential enlargement.
In establishing criteria to measure interoperability
progress, two efforts currently underway will have a significant
impact. NATO/PfP military exercises have achieved measurable
momentum. Three PfP exercises took place in 1994, 8 in 1995, and
24 in 1996. Held at the brigade-level over the past year, the
first joint corps-level exercise is planned for 1997. I.O.s are
now being incorporated in exercise specifications and final
exercise reports are to be included in the PARP. A significant
obstacle, however, could revolve around resource limitations and
financial constraints in expanding the number of such military
exercises and in developing serious evaluations of partner
performance.
"Lessons learned" from IFOR operations in Bosnia will be of
considerable importance to both NATO and partners. Sixteen nonNATO nations participated in IFOR; of these, 13 are partners who
contributed 5,200 personnel of the 51,300 total, and 12
participate in the PARP.15 There is general recognition in NATO of

28

the need to be prudent in drawing conclusions from IFOR. For
example, future NATO participation in peace operations may
require only limited force involvement and therefore should
neither be confused with, nor detract from the goal of general
purpose (Article 5) force planning and joint training. In
addition, some IFOR partner participants experienced significant
distortions and stresses on their defense budgets.
Partners, on the other hand, have been tempted to view
participation in IFOR as a short cut for admission to NATO,
particularly as the operation proved successful. NATO must also
consider the following factors: (l) the extent to which partner
military establishments have consulted civilian authorities prior
to joining IFOR; (2) the extent IFOR participation has delayed
other necessary internal reforms; and (3) the degree to which
budgetary distortions have occurred in partner economic plans.
Finally to be kept in mind is the amount of pressure felt to
"join the willing"; the sense among some partners that IFOR
participation was a necessary criterion for serious consideration
for NATO membership.
At the heart of internal NATO concern when weighing new
membership is the changing multipurpose nature of the Alliance.
NATO is not only now concerned with peace operations,
humanitarian assistance, sea rescue, and peace enforcement
operations as mandated by the NAC, but the Alliance is also faced
with drastically reduced force levels and greater budgetary
constraints. As a result, NATO may have to reexamine and possibly
lower the threshold between Article 4 capabilities and the
Article 5 (nuclear) planning level. Within NATO some worry that
the organization may be moving in directions for which there has
been little preparation, and PfP applications for membership add
to existing doubts and uncertainties.
These appear to be the principal reasons why political and
military criteria for new members remain undefined. But, as
decision time approaches, their definition will become
increasingly essential if NATO is to have credibility with those
PfP participants excluded.
NATO's Political "Principles" as Enlargement Objectives.
NATO's great historic success might be described as having
formed the reconciliation between two former adversaries--Germany
and France. The institutionalization of transparent defense
budgeting and force planning, common defense resource management
practices, and communications, command, and interoperability
standards have also contributed to building confidence and
developing security among European allies. Smaller NATO members,
such as the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, and
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Norway, today feel more secure in the shadow of their large
German neighbor because of the practices that have been
institutionalized in NATO.
Over the past half century, the development of confidence,
security, and stability in the Western half of Europe has been
NATO's greatest singular achievement. NATO's great challenge for
the opening of the 21st century is to now expand that
institutionalized zone of confidence, security, and stability to
Europe's Eastern half through enlargement and to facilitate these
countries' "return to Europe." This remains NATO's challenge and
historic mission and is the reason why enlargement should occur.
The Alliance began developing general principles for
enlargement with the creation of the NACC at the 1991 Rome
Summit, in the PfP program launched in January 1994, and in the
Study on NATO Enlargement in September 1995. Also during this
period, President William Clinton's speeches and Secretary of
Defense William Perry's "five principles" emphasized that new
members should conform to basic political principles such as
democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law; demonstrate a
commitment to economic liberty and free market; adhere to OSCE
norms and principles involving treatment of ethnic minorities and
social justice; resolve territorial disputes by establishing good
neighbor relations; and establish democratic control of the
military.
The Study on NATO Enlargement further stipulated the
following necessary conditions: (1) it defined what constitutes
"effective" democratic control of the military--to include
defense management reforms in areas such as transparent defense
planning, resource allocation and budgeting, appropriate
legislation, and parliamentary and public accountability; and (2)
it declared that some minimal degree of military capability and
NATO interoperability was necessary.
In addition to active participation in PfP, new members
would have to ensure that adequate resources are available to
assume the added and considerable financial obligations of
joining, and to develop necessary interoperability--to include
minimal standards in collective defense planning to pave the way
for more detailed operational planning with the Alliance.
Finally, new members should not "close the door" to future
candidate members.16
These principles and the incentives of NATO enlargement have
planted the seeds for reform in Europe's "Eastern" half. Indeed,
many have germinated to form the building blocks for developing
"real" confidence and security in this region.
Similar to the historic Franco-German reconciliation, we
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are witnessing the beginning of a just as significant historic
reconciliation between Poland and Germany. This has been embedded
in treaty, which recognizes borders, and in combined military
activities and cooperation. Similarly, Poland has expanded the
zone of confidence-building and security to Lithuania and
Ukraine. A few other examples nurtured by the incentives of NATO
enlargement include the recently concluded basic treaties between
Hungary and Slovakia, and Romania and Hungary. Such treaties not
only recognize existing borders, but also establish principles
for the treatment of ethnic minorities.17
Second, NATO has planted the seeds of military and political
cooperation and confidence-building not only in the Partnership
Coordination Center at Mons, but in the planning and review
process at NATO Headquarters. The PARP forms the institutional
basis for transparent force planning and developing real
confidence in Europe's Eastern half.
Third, what will all of this confidence and security
nurtured by NATO enlargement cost? Though some initial estimates
vary considerably and appear expensive,18 the reality is probably
not very much. Poland, a large aspiring NATO member of 38
million, recently completed its "Estimated Cost of NATO
Enlargement: A Contribution To the Debate" which concluded that
NATO accession will cost Poland $1.5 billion over a 15-year
period; and that Poland could absorb most of that burden from its
defense budget.19 Yes, enlargement will cost everyone something,
but the burden will be manageable.
To conclude, NATO's enlargement represents a further
extension of NATO's historic achievements to the half of Europe
that has been denied the benefits enjoyed by the West and
facilitates its "return to Europe." By creating incentives
through enlargement, NATO has created, at bargain basement cost,
the building blocks for developing real confidence, stability,
and security in Europe. This will be NATO's 21st century
challenge and historic mission.
The Need for a NATO Strategy.
The Alliance has been addressing one issue at a time when
there is a pressing need for a broad strategic approach,
preferably before the July 1997 Summit when partners anticipate
announcement of the first tranche of candidates for NATO
admission. In particular, partners expect that specific
political, economic, social, and military criteria will be made
clear. President Clinton's speeches, Secretary of Defense Perry's
"five principles," and the Study on NATO Enlargement provide a
useful starting point. But the NAC will soon be required to
design links in three critical areas:
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• The processes by which political compatibility between
NATO and PfP partners should evolve (from NACC to an Atlantic
Partnership Council--APC);
• The ways in which NATO should strengthen ties with EU and
Western European Union (WEU);
• Defining how military interoperability is to be achieved
in light of the limited economic and financial resources
available to PfP partners.
Also NATO needs to answer a number of ancillary questions:
Notably how do we ensure the integrity of Alliance consensus once
membership is opened? How do we ensure that enriched PfP costs do
not "come out of NATO's hide?"
The NATO outreach program to excluded partners could become
stymied by other factors. Some partners not included in first
tranche admission could well conclude that NATO has no intention
of proceeding to a second or third stage, thus raising doubts
about the advantages of reorganizing and modernizing their
military at considerable cost if NATO membership is a chimera. In
short, the Alliance must address not only criteria, but also how
to deal with a "failed suitor" syndrome on the part of
disappointed applicants.
What Needs To Be Done?
First, it is clear that the partnership needs a strengthened
political component to address and offset the imbalance between
the well-developed military and the under-developed political
components of PfP. A major step would be to establish a permanent
partnership staff element at NATO Headquarters in Brussels as a
political counterweight to the military PCC at SHAPE in Mons. The
International Partnership Staff (IPS) would be equivalent to the
NATO International Staff (IS) which reports to the NAC and the
International Military Staff (IMS) which serves the Military
Committee. The IPS would provide the necessary political balance
for PfP and would focus and coordinate partnership activities.
A primary task of the IPS would be to support an expanded
political partnership forum in Brussels; what the December 1996
NAC ministerial has proposed as "a single new cooperative
mechanism" called the APC.20 But the IPS should also promote and
support a greater (and self-funded) role in the numerous NATO
committees. Partner states need to gain more influence in all
aspects of political planning and decisionmaking which affect the
PfP process.
What the APC's relationship to the NACC will become remains
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unclear, in part because its concept is as embryonic as was the
PfP concept in January 1994. But if the APC were to become a
really effective political body (as PfP has become), it should be
more selective than the NACC in its membership. Indeed, one of
the reasons for the NACC remaining moribund has been the fact
that the decision to include all successor states from the
former Soviet Union diluted its political utility from inception.
Despite the NACC's well-recognized limitations, it should
continue to exist as NATO's umbrella for an inclusive, undivided
Europe. The APC, though, should be more exclusive and act as a
political training institution for aspiring NATO members.
Therefore, as a result of partner self-selection, the APC might
be limited only to those PARP partners who aspire "immediate"
NATO membership. Hence, if Bulgaria were to change its policy and
decide that it wanted to join NATO, Bulgaria could join the APC.
The APC, in marked contrast to the NACC, would be the
institutional forum in which the political integration of PARP
participants would occur. The APC could meet monthly in
consultation with the NAC (as do WEU associate partners and
associate members with the Council). Political integration of
potential new members could be furthered and improved by
expanding their access to NATO STANAGS and I.O.s to further
develop their force planning processes.
Second, NATO needs to develop deeper ties to the EU. An
initial step linking NATO and the WEU (and by extension EU) was
the decision taken at the June 1996 Berlin NAC by the 16 NATO
foreign ministers, making it possible for European members to
organize military operations "without the U.S. in the lead."21
Conceptually, political decisions on launching European-led NATO
operations will be taken by the WEU, a 10-member organization
with no substantial military resources of its own. Combined Joint
Task Forces (CJTFs) emanating from NATO are expected to partially
enhance WEU crisis management capabilities.
This new initiative could serve as a launch pad for tying
NATO and PfP partners more closely together with EU, particularly
in establishing economic planning and internal order criteria.
Enhancement of ties with EU could help overcome the existing
political and economic compatibility shortfalls in NATO's
criteria dialogues with PfP partners, helping to establish
recognized standards for full membership in both institutions.
Compatibility of interests already exists in that the Alliance's
Strategic Concept of 1991 and the EU Maastricht treaty were
actually worked out side-by-side.
Little, if any, planning has occurred to date within NATO on
the establishment of a constructive relationship with the EU. The
EU can provide helpful guidance to PfP not only in establishing
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economic planning priorities, but also on an important program
area outside NATO's purview regarding security--police operations
dealing with organized crime and corruption, and the maintenance
of internal order. The potential of the EU in both fields is
reflected in the fact that it has a more extensive formal
relationship with Moscow than does NATO.
The EU has also outpaced NATO in seeking to broaden ties
with Central and Eastern European countries. For example, it has
offered the Central European "democracies" full membership in
principle while concluding association agreements in the
interim. These agreements permit 10 associate partners and 3
associate members (Austria, Finland, and Sweden) to participate
in WEU institutions. Since 9 of the 11 PfP partners aspiring NATO
membership are also WEU associate partners (Albania and FYROM are
the two excluded), the EU and WEU can be effective in "softening"
the blow of NATO exclusion for many of the "failed suitors."
Efforts should be made to encourage convergence of the EU
and WEU and full membership for Central European "democracies" at
an early date, thereby providing an interim solution to their
security needs while awaiting NATO admission. (This would be
particularly important for the three Baltic states.)22 This
approach would facilitate linkage of so-called European and
Atlantic security pillars. The most pressing need is to establish
interlocking (economic and political) criteria with more clearly
defined interoperability (political-military and military)
criteria in order to provide PfP members a clearly delineated
chart by which to measure qualifications for full membership in
both institutions.
Third, NATO political restructuring is necessary. To draw
the various levels together in a viable whole, NATO might create
an Assistant Secretary General (ASG)-level position for PfP to
oversee external coordination with the EU/WEU and internal IPS
activities. Precedent for this has already been established on
NATO's military side, when the Berlin NAC ministerial in June
1996 established a deputy SACEUR to act as liaison with the WEU.
The viability of such a position would depend on the
willingness of NATO members to support internal realignment of
functions and responsibilities, as well as support for the ASG to
serve as NATO's primary point of contact with the EU. Part of the
ASG's responsibility should be to enhance partner understanding
of NATO-WEU strategic thinking and to integrate NATO
interoperability criteria with a partner's force planning. Most
particularly, the ASG for PfP would require an individual
prepared to discuss realistically with the EU and WEU how to
establish a common standard for the assessment of a partner's
progress. In addition, the PfP ASG must make clear that an
invitation to join NATO does not grant automatic admission.
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Programs of objectives and clear time lines should be negotiated
with partners.
Fourth, political and military principles, viewed as
necessary but not sufficient conditions for NATO membership and
which have evolved over time, must be made clear so as to justify
NATO's decision of "who" NATO actually invites, and to credibly
explain why certain partners have been temporarily excluded.
Political and military principles also will be necessary to keep
partners engaged in their reform programs.
Fifth, if the NATO Madrid Summit "invitation strategy" was
to ask three partners--the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary-to commence accession talks immediately, NATO might also announce
that it would look forward to starting accession talks with
Slovenia and Romania in 12-18 months after the summit upon their
completion of specified (but varying) objectives. Romania and
Slovenia could each use the added time to proceed with and
consolidate their reforms and to build their military
institutions respectively.23 Correspondingly, as NATO begins to
develop consensus among its 16 members, the Madrid Summit might
decide to slip Poland and/or Hungary into the delayed group
pending completion of their respective democratic control of the
military reforms and demonstration of progress in building an
adequate defense consensus and defense budget.24
The invitation "formula" is likely to be the result of a
bargaining process within the Alliance as it attempts to develop
consensus on "who" to invite. The opening salvo in NATO's
"bargaining" process has been advanced by France's support for
Romania in the first tranche and by Italy's support for Slovenia.
In addition, Turkey has further complicated the process by
holding its admission to the EU as its price for supporting NATO
enlargement.
If NATO were to extend an invitation to these "five"
partners, NATO programs would need to be established for the six
"failed suitors" to keep them engaged in their internal reforms
and involved in deepening cooperation with Euro-Atlantic
institutions. Enhanced PfP packages and APC participation will be
necessary and helpful, but may prove inadequate. In this regard,
if NATO had an IPS and ASG for PfP and institutional and
cooperative links with the EU (and WEU), stabilizing Slovakia and
the three Baltic states would be made easier and their "landing"
after the summit would be softened.
Dealing with Albania and FYROM will be more difficult
because of the absence of an EU-"safety-net." Hence, NATO policy
and allied bilateral policies will become more important and
essential as tools to keep these two "failed suitors" engaged.
Bulgaria does not qualify as a "failed suitor" because NATO
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membership is not a goal on its immediate horizon, but it is tied
to the EU and is an associate partner in the WEU. Therefore,
these additional tools are available to engage and stabilize
Bulgaria.
NATO's post-enlargement summit relations with Russia and
Ukraine might also be improved. In addition to what evolves in
NATO's strategic relationship with each of these two states
through charters and/or treaties, Russia and Ukraine also might
participate in the monthly NAC/APC sessions to further develop
confidence and advance their understanding of NATO affairs.
In summary, a coordinated NATO-EU enlargement strategy would
help NATO to establish Article 4 and Article 5 compatibility and
interoperability criteria to facilitate real partner reform. It
would help NATO overcome the "failed-suitor" syndrome that would
likely result from those partners excluded from a first NATO
enlargement tranche. It would provide the catalyst for needed
internal NATO structural reform--an ASG for PfP, IPS, and APC--to
enhance partner political cooperation and integration. Finally,
it would provide partners with realistic goals (of what they
need to do and to assess costs) so each partner government can
turn to its respective society to choose which among its
economic/political (EU) or defense and security (NATO) priorities
should take precedence in the nation's agenda to "return to
Europe."
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2
1. On January 25-26, 1990, Czechoslovakia's President Vaclav
Havel visited Hungary and Poland and called on all three
countries to coordinate their "return to Europe."
2. NATO Information Service, London Declaration on a
Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, Brussels: NATO Information
Service, July 5-6, 1990, Articles 7 and 8.
3. Treaty on the Final Settlement With Respect to Germany,
September 12, 1990, U.S. Senate, 101st Congress, 2nd Session,
Treaty Document 101-20, S-385-13, p. 6.
4. The Western Group of Soviet Forces would complete their
withdrawal from Germany by September 1994, as would the Northern
Group of Soviet Forces from Poland.
5. Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, NATO Press
Communique S-1(91)86, November 8, 1991, Article 11, pp. 4-5.
6. For the full text of Yeltsin's secret letter on NATO
expansion, see Mlada Fronta Dnes, Prague, December 2, 1993, p. 6.

36

7. "Declaration of the Heads of State and Government issued
by the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, Belgium," NATO Press
Communique M-1(94)3, January 11, 1994, p. 4.
8. "Final Communique, North Atlantic Council, December 1,
1994," Press Communique M-AC-2(94)116, p. 3.
9. "Final Communique, North Atlantic Council, December 5,
1995," Press Communique M-NAC-2(5)18, p. 5.
10. "Final Communique, North Atlantic Council, June 3,
1996," Press Communique M-NAC-1(96)63, pp. 7-8.
11. "Final Communique, North Atlantic Council in Ministerial
Session, December 10, 1996," Press Communique M-NAC-2(96)165, p.
3.
12. These were the terms of reference adopted at the January
1994 Brussels Summit.
13. "Final Communique of the North Atlantic Council,
December 5, 1995," Press Communique M-NAC-2(95)118, p. 2; and
"Statement on Bosnia-Herzegovina, December 5, 1995," Press
Communique M-NAC- 2(95)119, p. 1.
14. Personal interview, NATO Headquarters, April 1996.
15. Vernon Penner, "Partnership For Peace," Strategic Forum,
No. 97, December 1996, p. 2.
16. Study on NATO Enlargement, Brussels: September 1995, pp.
2, 13, 22-25.
17. Treaty on Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation
Between the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Hungary, March
18, 1995, Article 6; Treaty of Understanding, Cooperation, and
Good Neighborliness Between Romania and the Republic of Hungary,
September 16, 1996, Article 7. For a more thorough discussion,
see Hans Binnendijk and Jeffrey Simon, "Hungary's ‘Near Abroad',"
Strategic Forum, No. 93, November 1996.
18. Richard Kugler has posed estimates of $10 to $50 billion
varying with assumptions. See Richard Kugler, "Defense Program
Requirements," in Jeffrey Simon, ed., NATO Enlargement: Opinions
and Options, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press,
1995, pp. 185-207; the Congressional Budget Office study
estimates vary from $60.6 to $124.7 billion. See The Costs of
Expanding the NATO Alliance, Washington, DC: Congressional Budget
Office, March 1996, p. xiv.
19. "Estimated Cost of NATO Enlargement: A Contribution to

37

the Debate," pp. 18-19, Embassy of Poland mimeo.
20. "Final Communique, North Atlantic Council, December 10,
1996," Press Communique M-NAC-2(61)65, p. 5.
21. "Final Communique, North Atlantic Council, June 3,
1996," Press Communique M-NAC-1(96)63, Paragraph 7, p. 5.
22. For a more thorough discussion of this issue, see Hans
Binnendijk and Jeffrey Simon, "Baltic Security and NATO
Enlargement," Strategic Forum, No. 57, December 1995.
23. For a more thorough discussion, see Jeffrey Simon and
Hans Binnendijk, "Romania and NATO," Strategic Forum, No. 101,
February 1997.
24. For a more complete discussion of the problems in
Poland's democratic control of the military and in Hungary's low
defense expenditures and weak consensus, see Jeffrey Simon, NATO
Enlargement and Central Europe, Washington, DC: National Defense
University Press, 1996, esp. Chapters IV and V.

38

CHAPTER 3
NATO EXPANSION AND RUSSIA:
HOW WILL THEIR RELATIONS CHANGE?
Leon Goure
INTRODUCTION
At this time, Russian-NATO relations are still in an early
negotiation stage, given that preceding attempts, such as
Washington's efforts to draw Russia into the Partnership for
Peace program, have yielded little results. At the same time,
Russia has failed to persuade the West to adopt a new security
system based on the Organization for Security and Coopertion in
Europe (OSCE) which would have largely neutralized NATO by giving
Russia a say over its actions. Moscow is still voicing strong
criticism of NATO's enlargement, warnings (although by and large
in vague terms) of dire consequences if it is implemented, and
demanding a voice in NATO's decisionmaking and actions. All of
this suggests that for now Moscow is holding to its maximum
bargaining position and demands despite the various schemes and
concessions proposed by NATO and the United States to deal with
Russia's complaints.
Despite Russia's obviously weak position, it has already
achieved significant successes by its so-called "uncompromising"
negative stance on NATO's enlargement, unceasing complaints, and
threats. True, occasionally some Russian officials appear to hint
at possible compromises, but this seems more intended to keep the
dialogue alive and NATO's concessions coming, even though Moscow
is, in fact, apparently resigned to the inevitability of NATO's
enlargement. Russian officials and analysts, including Foreign
Minister Evgeniy Primakov, are convinced that their constant
complaining pays off and say so publicly. This implies that, at
this time, Moscow has little incentive to change its strategy,
all the more so as it gives it the opportunity to try to exploit
differences between views among NATO's senior members. It is
suggested that this strategy generally could be pursued until
1999 when the enlargement would actually be put into practice.
Indeed, Russia is in the enviable position of being able to hold
to its negative position while leaving the burden of offering new
initiatives in the dialogue and negotiations to NATO and
especially the United States. To quote a Russian analyst: "NATO
representatives are running around trying to settle all Russian
issues by the time of the Madrid summit (in July 1997). Russia's
task is simpler--it has nowhere to run."1 Of course, there is a
risk that, by making public Russia's maximum demands, President
Yeltsin and Primakov may find themselves locked in by domestic
political pressures and unable to make concessions of their own
to reach an agreement with NATO. But this would likely be more
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damaging to Russia's than to NATO's interests. In any event, the
outcome of Russian-NATO negotiations is uncertain, given that at
this time it is not known how far NATO will go in its attempts to
placate Moscow.
Of course, future Russian-NATO relations will not depend
solely on the outcome of the negotiation process concerning
NATO's enlargement. Other major uncertainties or variables can
greatly influence and shape these relations. The most immediate
one is the political instability of the ruling Russian regime and
how the political character of the Russian states will evolve in
the near term. The political effects of Yeltsin's illness and the
evidence of active struggle for power among various pretenders to
the presidency and factions among the elite illustrate this
problem. Russia is as yet neither a full-fledged democracy with
strong democratic traditions nor does it have a real free-market
system. In fact, Russia's economy has been characterized as
"nomenklatura capitalism." It is uncertain how leadership
succession will actually work. Another uncertainty concerns the
continued stability and cohesion of Russia and the Center's
effective control of the regions. Still a further uncertainty is
Russia's future relations with other member republics of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which could strongly
influence NATO's views on partnership with Russia and perceptions
of a potential Russian threat to NATO. Furthermore, Russian-NATO
relations are likely to be strongly influenced by how Moscow
cooperates with the United States and NATO on issues of arms
control and the implementation of arms control agreements.
Finally, these relations will be sensitive to the conduct of
Russian foreign policy elsewhere in the world, especially in
areas believed to be unstable and of special interest to Western
Europe and the United States.
Yet, while these uncertainties can significantly influence
the views of NATO's member states on Russia, it still remains
that Moscow's options and freedom of action in response to NATO's
enlargement are quite limited in the foreseeable future. In fact,
despite all their complaints, warnings, and hints at
"countermeasures," Russians by and large discuss the consequences
of NATO's enlargement in noticeably less dire terms as far as
future Russian relations with the West are concerned than do
various Western critics of the enlargement. There is a
possibility, therefore, that NATO may come to suffer from greater
self-induced fears than are reasonable, given a realistic
appraisal of what Moscow can actually do and what of its
priorities and vital interests are most likely to remain. Given
the gravity of Russia's domestic economic, political, social, and
ethnic problems and the potential threat they pose to the
country's stability and Yeltsin's regime, the Russian anti-NATO
enlargement campaign has, to some extent, the characteristics of
an attempted diversion from Russia's domestic troubles in the
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traditional Russian manner of reacting to problems by first
looking for someone to blame them on, preferably foreigners.
Still, there are what many in the West are willing to
recognize as legitimate Russian security concerns about the
enlargement which need to be dealt with. In Moscow, the greatest
fear appears to be that Russia may find itself isolated or
relegated to the periphery of European affairs. Publicly,
however, much attention is given to military security questions,
especially to the claim that the enlargement would introduce
major unfavorable changes into the Russian-NATO military balance,
and that this may pose a threat to Russia's security in the
future if the West were to decide to adopt anti-Russian policies.
However, many Russian officials, analysts, and commentators claim
that the issue of NATO's enlargement is for Russia a
fundamentally psychological one, in that it would be a blow to
Russian pride and self-image as a "great power," bring home the
fact that it is the loser in the Cold War and is "rejected" by
the West, and painfully underscore its weakness--some say
"helplessness"--vis-a-vis the West. Even so, how much the
enlargement might become the critical cause of worsening trends
in Russian relations with NATO and the United States in the
longer term is debatable.
THE QUESTION OF POTENTIAL POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES FOR RUSSIA
There have been and continue to be warnings from various
sources that NATO's enlargement may have dire political
consequences for Russia, consequences which may have highly
undesirable effects on Russian-Western relations. One of these is
that it may adversely affect Russia's democratization process,
indeed, that it may reverse it, even though the U.S. Government
has maintained that Russia's democratization is "irreversible."
Another consequence would be a reinforcement of Russian
xenophobia and especially the already evident Russian hostility
to the United States.
Russia's Democratization Question.
Several facts provide a context to this question and to an
examination of the validity of concerns about possibly
significant adverse effects on Russia's democratization process.
First, it should be noted that, as is generally acknowledged,
foreign policy issues--and this includes the threat of NATO's
enlargement--played no significant role in Russia's presidential
and gubernatorial elections in 1996. Despite the fact that it has
agitated the politically active elite and been widely debated by
the mass media, the general Russian public has been pretty much
indifferent to it. The main driving factor in Russian democratic
policies is economics, that is, the question of how to achieve
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economic growth, pay off arrears in wages and debts, reverse the
decline of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (6 percent in 1996)
and in industrial and agricultural production. The biggest
political threat to the Yeltsin regime comes from its failure to
solve Russia's economic mess and retain the population's
confidence. Even though Yeltsin won the presidential election in
1996, many Russians are looking for a "strong hand" or even
"fist" to bring order to the country, clean up corruption and
criminality, and improve the population's lot; hence General
Lebed's continued high popularity. From the standpoint of many
Russians, democracy has failed because it has simply become the
tool and plaything of power hungry politicians, the "new Russian"
plutocrats, and of the "Mafia," leaving little room for the
general population to participate in and benefit from the
democratic process. The way the presidential elections were run
could be said to cast serious doubts on the depth of Russian
politicians' acceptance and practice of democratic principles.
Second, it is important to note that warnings that some
actions by the West could adversely influence Russia's democratic
process have been played by Yeltsin, pretty much up to his
election victory in July 1996. Starting with Foreign Minister
Kozyrev, there have been many warnings echoed by Western leaders
and politicians that Yeltsin and his reform policies were the
best hope for bringing about a democratic Russia, as against the
threat of a resurgent Communist Party, and that criticism merely
served to open the way to power by nondemocratic forces. The
exploitation of this theme by Russian officials and politicians
largely ceased after the elections. Only occasionally is it
mentioned that NATO's enlargement may be used by reactionary and,
military elements to arouse "mass hysteria" and, presumably,
threaten the Yeltsin regime.2 But such a popular reaction is
assumed to occur from a concentrated campaign by the mass media
to this end. This is doubtful for several reasons. First, the
major part of the media, especially television, is controlled by
the government or its allies in big business, and it is unlikely
that the opposition would find all that many outlets. This was
already illustrated during the presidential elections by the way
the media treated Communist Party leader and candidate Zyuganov
and also Lebed. True, the enlargement might also be used in
principle by some elements to attempt a coup d'etat. But again,
the real motivation for this most probably would be economic,
such as the desperate state of the armed forces and industrial
workers because of arrears in the payments of wages, inadequate
budgets, growing unemployment, and so on.
Another point to be taken into account is that Yeltsin and
his government are on record as "uncompromisingly" opposing
NATO's enlargement and actively campaigning against it in the
West. There is, therefore, less ground for attacking them when
the enlargement takes place. At the same time, Yeltsin and the
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government insist that they will continue reforms and have not
tied this question to the NATO enlargement issue, instead
asserting that such a policy will lead to improvements in the
population's standard of living. In fact, many Russian
politicians and analysts emphasize that Russia must become a
"civilized" state, with "civilized" foreign relations or, in
other words, become more like the great Western powers.
Russian Anti-Americanism.
It is true that there has been growing anti-Americanism in
Russia, mainly voiced by politicians, the military, and the mass
media. This trend predates the question of NATO's enlargement. It
began not long after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in
1991 and has accelerated after the end of what Russians
characterize as the "romantic" and "excessively" pro-Western and
pro-American phase of Russian foreign policy said to have been
practiced by Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev. Indeed, this largely
uncritical period of Russian views of the United States was based
on various highly unrealistic expectations of massive U.S.
economic assistance, global power-sharing and special
partnerships, and so on. There has been growing disappointment
with the U.S. and Western policies in this respect, even though
Western consumer goods and technologies have and continue to be
very much in demand, and there is still much popular admiration
for U.S. "culture," such as films, music, clothing and hair
styles.
Russians emphasize that the appointment of Evgeniy Primakov
to the post of Foreign Minister has brought about a reorientation
of the Russian government's views to a more balanced and
realistic approach to the West in general and the United States
in particular, resulting in a more active defense and pursuit of
Russia's national interests. This has led to disputes with
Washington as Russia has "toughened" its positions.3 More and
more the observation is made by Russian officials and analysts
that Russia and the United States are unlikely to become close
and true strategic partners because their interests all too often
conflict.4
As Russia tries to assert what it claims to be its global
interest and to regain its external influence, it sees itself
increasingly as a competitor rather than partner of the United
States and the West. Foreign Minister Primakov is especially
active in demanding recognition that Russia is a "great power"
and in promoting the concept of a global transition from a
bipolar to a multipolar world. According to him, Russia will be a
separate "power pole" in this world. He demands, therefore, that
the United States abandons its pretensions to "world leadership"
and "global hegemony."5 There are also Western observers who warn
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of deteriorating Russian-U.S. relations, but they tend to
attribute more responsibility for it to the NATO enlargement
issue than appears to be justified by the record of Russian world
outlook.6
It is important to note, however, that Yeltsin and Primakov
insist that East-West disagreements and conflicts of interest
must not be allowed to slide into confrontation and a new Cold
War. Obviously, given Russia's economic difficulties, Moscow
cannot afford to wage confrontational policies with the United
States or NATO. Furthermore, there are powerful influential
forces, in particular the business and banking oligarchy which
controls 50 percent or more of Russia's economy and is directly
represented in the Russian government, which would strongly
oppose any real break in Russia's relations with Western Europe
or the United States. The primary motivation of these influential
elements is making money, which is obtained largely from foreign
commercial relations. NATO's enlargement is less likely to
threaten the interests of these elements than Moscow's
overreaction to it, which may lead to Russia's isolation. It is
clear to most Russians that their country's economic recovery is
impossible without foreign trade, investments, and technology.
According to U.S. Deputy Treasury Secretary Larry Summers, if
Russia is to attain only Spain's per capita GDP level by the year
2020, its economy would have to grow by 6 percent per year.7
Unfortunately, so far Russia's GDP has continued to decline (by 6
percent in 1996, while industrial production declined by 5
percent). Thus, there is little incentive to continue to push
anti-Americanism too far and risk further deterioration of
Russia's economic situation.
RUSSIAN THREATS OF COUNTERMEASURES AND REALISTIC OPTIONS
Most Russian threats to resort to countermeasures in the
event of NATO's enlargement have been vague and of an unofficial
character. In fact, Yeltsin is reported to have directed Primakov
on January 6, 1997, to devise a flexible "action plan" dealing
with a range of measures which Russia might consider in the event
that NATO's enlargement is implemented, and Primakov gives every
indication of not wanting to burn any bridges to the West.8 As
far as any official and unofficial public discussions of possible
Russian countermeasures are concerned, they include the following
areas:
• organizing countervailing alliances to NATO;
• altering the arms control regime;
• military responses; and,
• foreign policy mischief-making.
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Countervailing Alliances.
There have been various threats that NATO's enlargement
would force Russia to look for allies and to try to form a
countervailing alliance. Mention was made of the CIS being
organized into a military defense alliance, and of a search for
other allies opposed to NATO's expansion and the threat of U.S.
hegemony. Among the more promising potential allies is said to be
the People's Republic of China (PRC), but mention is also made of
the possibility of forming alliances with India, Iran, Iraq, and
even Cuba.9 It is sometimes suggested that allies may also be
found among European states excluded from NATO membership. It is
less clear, however, why any of the mentioned alliances would
constitute a significant counterweight to NATO.

The CIS. Organizing the CIS as a real defensive alliance has
made little or no progress despite Moscow's efforts. Russian
proposals for a new European security system which would include
the CIS alliance as an equal to NATO have also gotten nowhere.
Among the difficulties facing Moscow are:
• The refusal of most key CIS members to participate in such
an alliance. Indeed, Ukraine hints that it might want to
eventually become a member of NATO.
• The military weakness of the CIS non-Russian republics.
When this is coupled with the dramatic deterioration of the
Russian armed forces, their chronic underfunding, and their
disastrous performance in Chechnya, Moscow is unlikely to have
the means to militarily build a CIS alliance into even the
semblance of an effective defensive force.
Actually, only Belarus wants to be reintegrated with Russia
and appears willing to form a military alliance with it, and to
serve as a forward glacis to it facing Poland and the Baltic
States. Some of the more militant Russian nationalists have
called this "the only real step to counter NATO" which may be
taken by the Russian leadership.10 There is, however, considerable
opposition in Russia to reunification with Belarus. Tadjikistan
also depends on Russian troops to prevent it from being overrun
by rebel forces from Afghanistan. In any case, the idea of the
CIS becoming a meaningful countervailing alliance to NATO in the
foreseeable future is a non-starter. It also appears unlikely
that Russia would be willing to accept the costs and risks of
trying to bring recalcitrant CIS members into an alliance by
force.

Alliance with the PRC. Yeltsin and other Russian officials,
as well as PRC leaders, have been enthusiastically talking about
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a "strategic partnership." This is said to include expanding
trade, Russian transfer of technologies and arms sales to the
PRC, settlement of border disputes, and so on. It is also said to
signal cooperation in opposing alleged U.S. global hegemony and
attempts to impose a mono-polar political and power system in the
world.11 But while Russo-PRC relations are said to be moving
toward a "strategic partnership," neither Moscow nor Beijing
claims that it would or could become a military alliance or even
a real political alliance. For example, Russia's Deputy Foreign
Minister Georgi Karasin has declared that: "the current RussianChinese partnership and their 21st Century strategic interaction
should not be seen as attempts aimed at forging some new alliance
or pact."12 The partnership, Russian officials insist, is not
directed against anyone. Moscow seems happy, however, that while
it criticizes U.S. policy in Taiwan and in the Far East, Beijing
reciprocates by criticizing NATO's enlargement.
In fact, however, the interests and objectives of the two
powers for the most part differ fundamentally, and their
partnership, while it has a potential for regional
destabilization in some areas, is not a countervailing alliance
to NATO. Furthermore, some Russians, and especially the military,
are uneasy about Russian arms sales to the PRC. In a speech to
CIS defense ministries in December 1996, Russian Defense Minister
Igor Rodionov mentioned the PRC among potential threats to
Russia, although naturally the United States and NATO were in
first place.13
One thing Russia and the PRC have in common is an interest
in American investments and in trade with the United States. Thus
an alliance between the two countries would be likely to threaten
the economic benefits of their relations with the United States.
It is argued, therefore, that "a political alliance between
Moscow and Beijing in the near future is not possible."14 Another
matter is that Russia is likely to continue to sell to the PRC
advanced weapon systems and help modernize the PRC's armed
forces. But the motivation for this is mainly Russia's desire to
expand arms exports to earn hard currency and keep its defense
industries alive.
Alliances with other states, in particular those Washington
considers rogue states, are highly unlikely. The political and
economic costs for Moscow would be too high and the benefits too
low. In fact, Russia may have thrown in the towel on this
countermeasure. Thus, Rodionov has declared that Russia has no
plans for a new military alliance to counter NATO, which
apparently applies to the CIS as well as the PRC and other
states.15
Arms Control.
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A frequently voiced warning by Russian officials,
politicians, and commentators is that NATO's enlargement will
spell the end of various arms control agreements. In particular,
it is claimed that it will ensure that START II will remain
unratified, and that the existing Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe (CFE) Treaty will have to be amended, agreements on CW and
BW also may not be ratified by the state Duma, and negotiations
on other arms control agreements will become more difficult, if
not impossible.

The START II Ratification Problem. It is important to note
that the Duma's opposition to ratification of START II precedes
by a considerable length of time the debate over NATO
enlargement. The treaty was submitted to the Duma for
ratification only in the summer of 1995, but the campaign against
it by communists, nationalists, and various defense experts and
retired military has been waged since soon after the treaty's
signing. The issue is as much or more political than military
because it is used by the opposition to attack and criticize
Yeltsin and his policies. Given that the Duma is essentially
dominated by the opposition, it has been easy for it to resist
the government's calls for ratification.
Ratification has been urged by Yeltsin personally as well as
by his foreign ministers and, most significantly, by top military
leaders.16 In the view of the military leaders and their experts,
START II is almost "manna from heaven" because it brings U.S.
nuclear forces closer in line with those Russia can afford to
maintain.17 The point is that without the treaty, Russia's
strategic nuclear forces will continue to fall further behind
those of the United States because a growing percentage of
Russian weapons are becoming obsolete and have to be withdrawn
from service, while funds for replacement weapons are
insufficient to make up the difference. It is asserted,
therefore, that:
@BLOCK QUOTE = An important START II provision, the military
think, is the fact that, in the number of warheads, the Treaty
brings U.S. nuclear forces down to a level which Russia is
objectively capable of maintaining.18
Others want guarantees that the United States will not break
the ABM Treaty and deploy ABM systems on its territory. Critics
insist, however, that START II gives the United States an
advantage while it forces Russia to destroy its most effective
strategic nuclear deterrence weapons, such as the SS-18 ICBMs,
and to invest large funds in the elimination of MIRVed missiles
and their replacement by missiles with a single warhead, such as
the Topol-M. It is argued, therefore, that there is a need to
renegotiate START II or put it aside while negotiating a START
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III Treaty. A particular problem from the Russian viewpoint is
the need to extend the time of implementation of START II and for
more help in funding it. Presumably, this is a matter for
negotiation with the United States.
Thus, while as a countermeasure to NATO's enlargement Russia
may persist in not ratifying START II and may delay the
dismantling of SS-18s as some urge, this appears to be a losing
tactic if Washington does not panic. As Chairman of the Duma's
International Affairs Committee Vladimir Lukin argues:
At present and for a lengthy period of time, Russia is
not capable of sustaining more warheads than set by the
treaty. It simply does not have the financial
possibility for this.19
In other words, Moscow may scream and rant, but it does not have
the means to maintain its current nuclear forces operational
beyond the next decade or so, and it certainly cannot go back on
START I or on the reductions already implemented under START II.
The effectiveness of this threatened countermeasure thus depends
on how much the United States feels pressured because of security
and domestic political considerations, given that it has a large
political investment in the START program. It also appears likely
that Moscow will use NATO's enlargement to demand compensation in
negotiations for the revisions of START II or a new START III
Treaty. There is little reason to expect, however, that the Duma
will be mollified by a U.S. promise to proceed to negotiation of
a START III Treaty after the ratification of START II, and thus
drop this presumed leverage on NATO's enlargement.20

The CFE Revision Issue. Russia's calls for revision of the
CFE Treaty, especially its flank limitations, have also preceded
the NATO enlargement issue, although calls for revision have been
exacerbated by the latter. Moscow has been unhappy with the
treaty ever since the breakup of the Soviet Union which radically
altered Russia's geostrategic position. Given this new situation,
Russian leaders claimed that the treaty limitations, especially
regarding flanks, were no longer realistic nor did they meet
Russia's security requirements. The problem became acute as a
consequence of the war in Chechnya and Moscow's announcement in
November 1995 that it would not abide by the treaty provisions in
the North Caucasus. The then Defense Minister General Pavel
Grachev demanded that Russia be free to deploy as many heavy
weapons on its flanks as it deemed necessary for its security.21
In fact, Moscow has demanded that the Caucasus be removed from
CFE limitations altogether.22
The United States and most of NATO have been sympathetic to
Russia's demands to renegotiate the CFE Treaty, but Russia has
rejected linkage between this and greater Russian accommodation
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to NATO's enlargement. The latter threat has increased Russia's
demands for the right to concentrate more forces and heavier
weapons in the Kaliningrad Oblast and the Leningrad Military
District than is allowed under the CFE Treaty. But the CFE
revision issue has only recently been tied by Moscow to NATO's
enlargement. Primakov now appears to make the question of NATO's
willingness to accept Russia's demands as a test claiming that
this "will serve as the main indicator of our partners' serious
intentions," that is, NATO's claimed readiness to meet Moscow's
security concerns. Primakov added that "Both Russia and NATO
members can agree on the most reliable, e.g., practical,
guarantees pertaining to mutual European security concerns along
precisely this channel."23
It is important to note that Primakov, and presumably
Yeltsin, want a negotiated settlement, and are not proposing
unilateral Russian actions in violation of the CFE Treaty, even
though they did violate it in the North Caucasus.24 As Yuri
Baturin, secretary of the Presidential Defense Council and
Yeltsin's security advisor, recently said, if NATO expands, "the
basis for this treaty [CFE] will collapse and it will have to be
revised, but revised jointly with its participants."25 Agreements
on this question may or may not demonstrate NATO's sincerity in
trying to meet Russian security concerns, but it appears unlikely
that it would reconcile Moscow to NATO's enlargement, more for
political than for security reasons. Besides, the issue of
revision of the CFE Treaty is likely to result in disputes and
strain within NATO, and Moscow hopes to profit from them.
Military Countermeasures.
There has been talk among Russian nationalists and the
military about military countermeasures to NATO's enlargement
other than revisions of START II and the CFE Treaty. Naturally,
the military see in this a possibility of improving defense
funding and regaining some prestige by having an identified
opponent. Most of the discussion, however, revolves around the
enhancement of Russia's nuclear deterrence capability, since most
people recognize that Russia is in no condition in the
foreseeable future to fund conventional forces matching NATO's
capabilities. Consequently, it is suggested that Russia might
retain its MIRVed SS-18 ICBMs as long as possible. Another
proposal is to retarget ICBMs on the capitals of the new NATO
members as a deterrent threat. Still another is to deploy
tactical and intermediate range nuclear armed missiles along the
western border and preferably in the Kaliningrad Oblast and in
Belarus, to be employed preemptively against NATO targets if
there is a threat of an attack on Russia.26 The preemptive strike
strategy and posture is said to be justified by Russia's weakness
in conventional forces.27 The problem is that a safe preemptive
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posture requires good intelligence and reliable early warning.
Russia's early warning and surveillance capabilities, however,
are said to be deteriorating.28 Whether NATO would be interested
in assisting Russia in this area as a confidence-building
measure is another matter. But to the extent that this is a
problem for Russia, a show of U.S. or NATO willingness to assist
in improving Russia's early warning and surveillance capabilities
might steal some of the thunder from Russian critics who warn
that NATO's expansion eastward could eventually lead to an attack
on Russia.
The obvious problem with a Russian nuclear countermeasure
option to NATO's enlargement is that it would probably result in
forcing NATO to do precisely what Russia wants to avoid, such as
deploying nuclear weapons and delivery systems on the territories
of new NATO members, improving the military infrastructure there,
and so on. It would probably also torpedo negotiations on the
revision of START II and on START III, worsen the military
balance from the Russian standpoint, and sharply reduce Western
economic assistance to Russia. Of course, as Russians observe,
NATO assurances that no nuclear weapons would be stationed on the
territory of new NATO members is something that can be easily
reversed after the enlargement is implemented.29 Moscow,
therefore, wants legally binding guarantees. But no guarantee is
likely to survive a Russian redeployment of nuclear weapons and
delivery systems to its western border and Belarus.
In any event, given the state of Russia's economy, Russia,
as Sergey Shakhray, Deputy Chief of Staff to the President
declares, could not afford to be drawn into a new arms race with
NATO.30 The Defense Ministry's plans for a possible start of
modernization of the Russian armed forces expect it to be around,
or even later than, 2007, assuming a significant economic
recovery by that time, and the survival of defense R&D and
industrial capabilities.31
Russian Foreign Policy or Mischief-Making.
The record of Russian foreign policy, especially since
Primakov became Russia's Foreign Minister, has shown that Moscow
has a considerable capacity for mischief-making. While this has
preceded the rise of the NATO enlargement issue, it is also
possible that within limits the latter may to some extent
aggravate this behavior.
Russia's position, as expounded by Primakov and endorsed by
Yeltsin, is that Russia is a "great power" and that its role in
the world must reflect that status. Primakov insists that Russia
"must pursue the foreign policy of a great power," and that this
policy "must be active and must be conducted in all directions";
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that is, Russia must claim an influential place in global
affairs.32 Primakov and other Russian officials believe that this
foreign policy line is facilitated by the trend towards
multiplicity in world policies, thus allowing Russia to diversify
its foreign relations ties and abandon its former "excessive
leaning" towards the West.33 Such an approach hardly signals a
commitment to real or close partnership with the United States or
with NATO.
Russia's pretensions to be recognized as a "great power"
with global interests and an influential voice in global affairs
exceed by far its capabilities to make such a claim credible. As
a result, Moscow has suffered frustrations and humiliations when
it has been ignored by the United States, NATO, or other states
where it sought to play a role. In turn, this has fueled Russian
anti-Americanism, Russia's pursuit of ties with states which are
considered to be sources of destabilization by the West, and has
produced a considerable amount of Russian mischief-making as a
show of independence at low cost. This kind of attempt at
conducting a "champagne foreign policy on a beer budget"
inevitably threatens to become an irritant to the United States
and the West. This is all the more so as Moscow claims to be
attempting to block U.S. efforts to gain hegemony or leadership
over the world.
Russian foreign policy in recent years appears to have been,
to a considerable extent, an imitation, if a pale one, of Soviet
foreign policy: closer ties with the PRC and Serbia; reentry into
the Middle East politics on the back of previous special ties
with Iran, Iraq, and Syria; special relations with India; and so
on. To do some of this, Moscow has openly criticized and opposed
U.S. and NATO policies, as in the case of the trade embargo of
Serbia, Iraq, or Libya, or U.S. naval presence in the Persian
Gulf. Moscow has ignored Western criticism of Russian military
actions in Chechnya and has opposed U.S. oil interests in
Azerbaijan. One particular demonstration of Russian pursuit of an
independent foreign policy and of economic profit has been the
sale of advanced weapon systems to foreign countries, even at the
risk that such sales could destabilize various regions, as in the
case of arms sales to the PRC, Iran, India, Syria, and, more
recently, Cyprus and Peru, and so on. In each of these cases, as
a Russian commentator notes, "Moscow and Washington are on
different sides of the front line."34
Moscow has been careful, however, not to allow its actions
to escalate into a confrontation with the United States or NATO.35
An analysis of what has been dubbed the "Primakov Doctrine" shows
that it allows Russia to pursue a low cost and relatively low
risk strategy of trying to claim a place in world politics and
bolstering its influence without losing the benefits from its
relations with the United States or the West in general.36 Moscow
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fears, however, that this low risk or cost policy phase may be
coming to an end. It is concerned that after the July 1996
presidential election, Washington will no longer be constrained
by the necessity of bolstering Yeltsin. Furthermore, the
Republicans still dominate Congress and the appointment of
Madeleine Albright as Secretary of State, dramatized in the
Russian press as "The Iron Lady" of U.S. foreign policy, is
interpreted as signaling a likely tougher U.S. foreign policy
line toward Russia. Whether this would necessarily motivate
Moscow to be more cautious in its actions is uncertain, because
Primakov and other officials believe that the trend toward a
multipolar world and greater "Eurocentrism" may allow it to find
greater support for its policy base.37
There is no indication, however, that in retaliation for
NATO's enlargement Russia would burn its bridges to NATO and the
West. In fact, it may have the opposite effect of accelerating
Russia's efforts to push for a new European security system and
to have a "responsible and dignified role" in it.38 Precisely
because Russia fears being isolated and marginalized as a result
of NATO's enlargement, it has no reason to help bring this about
by its own actions in its relations with NATO, either directly or
as a result of its foreign policy elsewhere in the world.
SOME OBSERVATIONS
Lately, as NATO and Washington have offered various
reassurances and concessions to Moscow, these have been claimed
by it as proof of the success of the current Russian government's
intransigent stand on NATO's enlargement and of the Russian
foreign policy line in the West in general. As Primakov puts it:
"As far as global implications are concerned, Russia has
obviously strengthened its positions inside the Big Eight."39
True, Moscow knows that it is unlikely to prevent the
implementation of the first phase of NATO's enlargement.
Consequently, a skeptical view of Russian foreign policy
"successes" points out that:
The joy over the shifts in the relations with NATO
[i.e., NATO's concessions] can be compared only to the
joy of a team hopelessly losing a match and repulsing a
series of attacks at its goal minutes before the end of
the match.40
All indications, however, are that by maintaining its
uncompromising stand, Moscow can expect to wring more concessions
from NATO.41 Indeed, NATO's desire to formalize Russian-NATO
relations--be it in a new charter, a treaty, or some consultation
arrangement--by July 1997 cannot be seen by Russian leaders as
other than further proof of the correctness of their policy. The
pay-off for Moscow, therefore, is that it can expect to gain by
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this strategy more advantageous terms in its relations in the
NATO summit. In fact, one should anticipate that this issue will
continue to provide Russia, as the "injured party," with a
convenient club to hold over NATO to be used to demand more
concessions and compensations, not only specifically in
connection with the enlargements or in a new European security
system, but also elsewhere in the world. Naturally, the success
of this strategy will depend on how far NATO members will be
willing to go to placate Russia's complaints and concerns.
It is worth noting that there is a Russian view that NATO's
enlargement will put great political and economic strains on NATO
and that this might even lead to an abandonment of this policy
and to an erosion of U.S. influence in Europe. General Aleksandr
Lebed, for example, said in January 1997 in Germany that he
believed that the first phase of the enlargement will be its last
because "internal tensions" will wrack the Alliance.42 Others
argue that the high cost of the enlargement will stimulate
growing opposition to it among Western European taxpayers. In
this view, U.S. policy pushing for the enlargement will fail,
which will intensify Europe's push to become more independent of
Washington's leadership and, consequently, will enhance Russia's
role in Europe's security.
In sum, it is doubtful that realistically, in the nearer
future, Russia will neatly take its place in the European
political and security system as a cooperative, full-fledged
democracy, sharing Western values. Indeed, it is pointed out that
"the Clinton Administration over the past four years never
achieved the main objective of its Russian policy; namely, to
turn Russia into a friendly and reliably non-hostile state."43
Western concessions or assistance are highly unlikely to buy such
a convenient development and, short of giving Moscow control over
NATO's actions, they will not bring about Moscow's official
acquiescence to NATO's enlargement. Russia's interests and
pretensions to "great power" status and ambitions to play this
role in the world will continue to produce actions conflicting
with the policies, objectives, and interests of the United States
and other NATO members.
It is fairly evident that, realistically, Russia has no
responses to NATO's enlargement that NATO needs to seriously
worry about. At the same time, however, Russia's relations with
NATO are likely to fluctuate between angry denunciations and
pursuit of dialogue, or even cooperation, as Moscow hopes to gain
a major voice in European affairs and NATO actions regardless of
Russia's weakness. In fact, given its instabilities as well as
economic and military weakness, Russia has nowhere to go in the
next decade or two. But, even so, differences between NATO allies
may give it an opportunity to improve its position. Whether NATO
needs to buy Russian tolerance of NATO's enlargement by offering
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concessions which undermine the security value of the enlargement
and NATO's guarantees is debatable. One can also confidently
predict that other issues will soon arise which most likely will
come to overshadow the enlargement issue in Russian-NATO
relations. This does not mean that there are no areas of common
interest between Moscow and the West or that there is no need to
consider the construct of a new European security system. But it
would seem prudent for NATO, and especially the United States,
not to be overcome by optimism and to recognize that, in the
foreseeable future, Russia will most likely remain a political,
strategic and even economic competitor rather than a reliable
partner.
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CHAPTER 4
REFORM, RUSSIA AND EUROPE:
THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT OF UKRAINE'S NATO POLICY1
Sherman Garnett
When NATO leaders meet in July 1997 to decide which states
will be invited to join the Alliance, Ukraine will not be under
active consideration. Yet Ukraine will not be a failed suitor. It
has not sought NATO membership, nor has any western country
seriously proposed Ukraine be considered for it. At this
juncture, Ukraine is plainly unready for NATO or the European
Union, Europe's core economic and security institutions. For the
next decade, Ukraine's core strategic challenges will have little
to do with whether it can get into NATO or even the kind of
partnership it fashions with the Alliance. Ukraine has serious
political and economic work to do to consolidate itself as a part
of Europe. It also has to find a way to normalize relations with
Russia. There is a danger in the coming months of focusing too
intensely on the details of the Ukrainian-NATO partnership, to
the neglect of the role NATO and the West might play in helping
Ukraine address these core strategic challenges and weathering
the inevitable shockwaves that expansion will bring to Eastern
and Central Europe.
Ukraine occupies a crucial, if often unacknowledged, place
in Europe which is the result of obvious geopolitical factors,
such as its size and central location between Russia and the
West. It is also the result of the impact on Russia, the region
and Europe as a whole of Ukrainian success or failure in
consolidating itself internally and fashioning a normal state-tostate relationship with Russia. NATO's stake in these issues is
obvious. One need only imagine a weak and failing Ukraine or a
Ukrainian-Russian relationship defined by conflict or resubordination to understand the potential Ukraine has for
becoming a center of instability in the new Europe. A strong
NATO-Ukrainian relationship is an important matter in and of
itself, but its real value will depend upon whether it is the
beginning of a broad Western recognition of Ukraine's strategic
significance and of policies designed to support that
recognition. Thus the purpose of this essay is to place the
Ukrainian-NATO relationship and the whole question of NATO
expansion in the broad strategic context that must preoccupy the
Ukrainian leadership. Only then can we turn to Ukraine's overall
western policy and its NATO policy in particular. This manner of
proceeding is not the one dictated by the press of summit
preparations, but it is the one that will yield a genuine
understanding of Ukraine's strategic dilemma and the roots of its
NATO policy.
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Ukraine's Strategic Dilemma.
For Ukraine, the most pressing tasks are internal,
particularly the consolidation of state institutions and the
creation of a prosperous market economy. The most pressing
external task is the normalization of relations with Russia. At
present, the external environment, despite the large unfinished
agenda with Russia, is extraordinarily favorable, perhaps the
most favorable for state-building that Ukraine has ever seen.
Ukraine wants to preserve this external situation, improving if
it can ties with Russia. Kiev wants to devote scarce resources to
internal challenges, not fending off external foes or dealing
with the spill-over from a regional crisis. Ukrainian foreign
policy must focus on the preservation and extension of the
current "breathing space." Though Ukraine is potentially a medium
power, it is currently a weak state. It does not have the means
to oppose or appease its enemies or entice its friends. Western
states and institutions are important sources for material and
political support to Ukraine as they address both internal and
external challenges.

The Internal Challenges. Despite the progress made to date
on political and economic reform, Ukraine is still a state in the
making. Moreover, the consolidation of this state is taking place
on the basis of a history of statelessness and a great abundance
of regional and ethnic diversity. Many analysts feared that both
factors, combined with poor economic performance and a dispute
with Russia and the United States over nuclear weapons, would
prevent Ukraine from consolidating as a state at all.
However, the question is not whether Ukraine will become a
state, but what kind. Ukraine is less likely to disappear than
become a weak and incoherent state spreading instability
throughout the region. Despite successful parliamentary and
presidential elections in 1994 and a new constitution in 1996,
the Ukrainian political system is still a closed one. It
concentrates power in a small number of hands. Civil society
exercises little control over--or indeed possesses little
knowledge of--the government. The press and media have not yet
become a genuine fourth estate. Political life in Ukraine is
defined by the tension between the reforming impulse carried
forward by the president and a small group of advisors and the
desire for gain on the part of the vast majority of senior
officials who have managed to enrich themselves by links with key
energy, banking, media, and industrial sectors. Corruption and
lack of statesmanship at the top of society is a drag on
progress, a distraction from measures needed to modernize and
stabilize Ukraine.
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Ukraine's weak economy is also a concern. President Kuchma's
1994 reforms have brought the economy back from the verge of
collapse in 1993. This reform package included a sweeping set of
measures designed to produce financial stabilization,
privatization, and price liberalization. Despite serious internal
opposition, at times extending to the executive branch itself,
and occasional lapses in the form of credit emissions, the
package has begun to bear fruit. There are as yet no signs of
economic growth, but the rates of decline in Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) and industrial production are slowing. These
official statistics do not capture the still unmeasured dynamism
of the "informal sector" of the economy, estimated by one study
to provide the "main source of income for 2.5 million people,
including up to 40 percent of youth in urban and border
regions."2 One of the most impressive aspects of the reform
package has been its dramatic reduction of inflation, from a high
of over 10,000 percent to approximately 80 percent for 1996.
Serious problems, however, continue to slow reform.
Privatization is not moving forward as swiftly or as
comprehensively as it should. The state remains the majority or
largest shareholder in many cases. The lack of a clear legal
base, weak courts, and bureaucratic corruption scare off most
foreigners. Opposition to privatization, particularly in the
communist and socialist-dominated stronghold in the eastern part
of the country, remains strong. The reform process remains
vulnerable to reversal, but the more likely danger is of a slow
and uncertain reform that widens the gap between Ukraine and
Poland or other emerging post-communist economies. This gap
already exists and makes serious economic cooperation, let alone
integration, difficult.
These internal challenges to stability are serious and
require the bulk of Ukraine's scarce resources and energy to
address. They are the number one political and national security
priority, not ties with NATO. Ukraine's approach to the outside
world, particularly to the West, is shaped by the requirement to
address this very large internal agenda.

Ukrainian-Russian Relations. Ukraine's greatest external
challenge is the normalization of its relations with Russia.
Normal and friendly relations between these states would be a
substantial contribution to European stability, as they have the
greatest military potentials of any of non-NATO Europe. Conflict
between them over Crimea or other issues would have an immediate
and chilling effect on European stability. More extreme
scenarios, such as the subordination of Ukraine to Russia, would
make credible the long-term military and political potential of
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). There is another
aspect to Russian-Ukrainian relations that has European-wide
significance. The Russian-Ukrainian relationship reveals much
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about Russia itself, particularly whether Russia is reconciled to
its current borders and to exerting its influence in a way that
is compatible with the stability and independence of its new
neighbors. Key issues of Russia's long-term evolution are bound
up in its relations with Ukraine. Ukraine is perhaps the greatest
single external factor in Russia's definition of itself as a
state and international actor.
Despite mutual suspicions and a conflicting sense of where
the relationship ought to be headed, both sides to date have
shown a high degree of moderation and pragmatism when it counted.
These qualities coexist with real disagreements, as well as
symbolic gestures and hard rhetoric that periodically suggest the
relationship is on the verge of a great crisis. The several
Yeltsin-Kravchuk summits and the successor meetings between
Yeltsin and Kuchma remain prime examples of how the two sides
have found ways to steer the relationship through rough waters.
The leaders regularly announce agreements on issues such as the
Black Sea Fleet or the Friendship Treaty that never materialize
or are soon broken in follow-up technical negotiations. They
probably knew these agreements would not hold up and intended to
use them to reduce the pressures of the moment and restore a
sense of normalcy, not obtain a long-term resolution of the
issues.
In the long run, however, a resolution is needed to define a
new basis for Russian-Ukrainian relations. This resolution would
require that Russia and Ukraine resolve existing ambiguities
about the future. Russia is reluctant to put the relationship
once and for all on a true state-to-state footing, hoping that,
over time, the two sides return to something more intimate than
that, something Yeltsin Advisor Dmitriy Riurikov described as a
"fraternal Slavic compromise."3 Russia does not want to thwart
this possible future by a settlement that strengthens Ukraine's
independence. Russia's policy remains in large measure what a
leading Russian analyst described in 1992 as a strategy "to keep
the Ukrainian problem within certain limits and to prevent it
from getting out of control."4 Whether or not it chooses
integration in the future, Ukraine would like an unambiguous
state-to-state relationship, but it is too weak and internally
divided to impose such a relationship on Russia. Thus, RussianUkrainian relations are likely to remain a classic example of
"muddling through" for some time.
This pattern has been stable so far, but this stability
rests on the exhaustion and preoccupations of both sides. Russia
is simply too burdened by its own internal problems; its basic
institutions are too chaotic and fragmented to provide the basis
for a sustained assertive policy. In this condition, Russia could
not manage a serious crisis within Ukraine, let alone carry out
interventionist policies. However, there are real dangers in
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assuming that the current stability can endure indefinitely, as
though a state of nature. Russian consolidation of its political
and economic system over time will increase its capacity to
conduct a more ambitious Ukrainian policy. The key is not in
Russia's size or strength, but the size of the gap between it and
Ukraine. Neither Russia nor Ukraine has moved away from the old
patterns of psychology, history, and Soviet inheritance to
contemplate their partner in the light of the new Europe-to-come.
For both sides, but especially in Russia, relations with the
other is more habit than strategy. As Ukraine moves more
dynamically toward ties with the West and Russia turns to its own
agenda in the south and east, old habits of interaction or even a
dangerous drift and neglect could emerge. Russians who now
complain loudly about the failure to fashion genuine engagement
with Poland and other states of Central Europe may yet complain
that a similar failure has occurred in Ukraine. Neither state
really understands the benefits of normal cooperation or the
necessity of placing their bilateral relationship on a broader
and more internationally accepted basis. The current and future
problem of managing relations with Russia is thus a second
factor shaping Ukraine's approach to the West and especially to
NATO. Many in Kiev doubt that the future of this key bilateral
relationship can be successfully negotiated without outside
support for a stable outcome.
Ukraine's Westpolitik.
If the preceding is an accurate sketch both of Ukraine's
major domestic and foreign policy preoccupations and of the
issues that give Ukraine a central role in the emerging security
environment of Europe, then the role the West plays for Ukraine
in addressing these issues is much larger than that encompassed
by the debate over NATO expansion. The preceding demonstrates
that Ukraine faces a long period where it must concentrate on its
internal challenges. These challenges essentially disqualify
Ukraine from near-term membership in the key western security and
economic institutions. It faces major hurdles in political and
economic reform. Externally, Ukraine's key challenge is to create
stable relations with Russia.
The West is an obvious source of support for sustaining
political and economic reforms. It is also a potential prop for
Ukrainian independence and the normalization of relations with
Russia. Western influence, both directly and indirectly through
the prospect of NATO and European Union membership, already have
a positive influence on Romanian-Ukrainian disputes. Thus the
West appears, first and foremost, as a potential source of
support for Ukraine. But NATO expansion potentially complicates
this paradigm by introducing a major shift in the geopolitics of
the region. The Ukrainian leadership fears that the unforeseen

62

effects of expansion and countermeasures by Russia could threaten
Ukraine's existing breathing space. It is a mixture of public
hopes and private fears about the future impact of the West on
Ukraine's core challenges that animates Ukraine's western policy
in general and its approach to NATO in particular.
Ukraine's overall western policy has greatly expanded,
especially since mid-1995. Ukraine could not have had serious
western interlocutors until the resolution of the nuclear issue.
The securing of the Soviet nuclear arsenal under single Russian
command and control was a western strategic priority. Until
Ukrainian nuclear intentions were clarified, a process that
lasted until at least 1994, there were few takers in the West for
a policy of engagement, though there were important voices,
especially in Poland and the United States, arguing for deepening
ties with Kiev in parallel with nuclear disarmament. The January
1994 Trilateral Agreement, Kuchma's economic reform package, and
Ukraine's adherence to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty later
that same year generated the momentum needed to sustain serious
ties between Kiev and western nations and institutions.
U.S.-Ukraine ties have steadily improved since the signing
of the Trilateral Agreement in January 1994. President Kravchuk
came to Washington within weeks of the signing of this agreement,
leading to new agreements of economic and other assistance that
have since made Ukraine the third largest recipient of U.S.
foreign aid. In May 1995, President Clinton visited Kiev. Senior
ministerial and deputy ministerial visits have been common.
During one of these visits, Foreign Minister Udovenko's meetings
in Washington in October 1996, the two sides publicly declared
their relationship a full-fledged strategic partnership. The
United States has also supported Ukraine's efforts to expand its
ties with other western nations and institutions. The United
States, for example, was the driving force behind the language in
the December NATO Ministerial communiqué stating the Alliance's
support for Ukrainian political and economic reform and
acknowledging that "the maintenance of Ukraine's independence,
territorial integrity and sovereignty is a crucial factor for
stability and security in Europe."5
Though ties with the United States have always been the
cornerstone of Ukraine's western policy, in mid-1995 the
Ukrainian leadership embarked on a policy designed to expand its
links with other western nations and key institutions. In
September 1995, Foreign Minister Udovenko led a high level
delegation to NATO to begin to define a special relationship
between Ukraine and the Alliance. In October 1995, with Poland's
strong support, Ukraine became a member of the Council of Europe.
In April 1996, addressing the Council of Europe Parliamentary
Assembly in Strasbourg, President Kuchma announced Ukraine's
strategic intention to become a full-fledged member of the
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European Union in the future. Poland was also crucial to
Ukraine's invitation to join the Central European initiative in
June 1996. In that same month, a Warsaw summit between Polish and
Ukrainian presidents produced strong statements of mutual
support, with Kuchma giving a ringing endorsement of Poland's
desire to join NATO. In September 1996, German Chancellor Kohl
visited Kiev, as did the Secretary General of the Western
European Union, Jose Cutileiro. Cutileiro and Kuchma agreed that,
for membership purposes, Ukraine would be treated like the six
former non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries and three Baltic states.
Ukraine would not have to wait for associate status in the
European Union, but could apply after ratification by all parties
of the June 1994 cooperation agreement between Ukraine and the
European Union.6
Yet despite the undoubted successes of Ukraine's western
policy, particularly in relations with Washington, Warsaw, and
Europe's key institution, Ukraine has still not succeeded in
convincing the majority of its European neighbors that it wants
or deserves a place in Europe. Many of the key states, including
France and the United Kingdom, have yet to recognize its
strategic importance or to act in a manner befitting this
insight. In the chancelleries of Europe, except for Chernobyl,
little thought is given to Ukraine. Ukraine's internal problems
and historic ties to Russia are taken as justification of this
neglect. Many of these states believe that the crucial task after
NATO expansion will be to rebuild ties with Russia, not expand
them with other states Russia regards as crucial to its own
security. There is thus a fragility to Ukrainian-Western ties.
The gains of Kiev could be easily reversed by its own internal
problems, its failure to make economic progress, or simply
western anxiety about Russia. Measured against the core
challenges facing Ukraine outlined at the beginning of this
essay, Ukrainian-Western ties still have a very long way to go
before they give Kiev real assistance. Kiev's approach to NATO
expansion has to be seen within this larger strategic picture.
Ukraine's NATO Policy.
Ukraine's policy toward NATO expansion is based on public
hopes and private fears. The public hopes are to see a more
stable Europe in which NATO expansion to some countries runs in
parallel with stronger strategic cooperation with the rest.
Ukrainian officials also understand the value of the NATO
Alliance and its role in European security. They support NATO as
a counterweight to Russian power. In this guise, it helps to
preserve the breathing space and permits Ukraine to consolidate
its independence. Senior Ukrainian officials also see the value
of anchoring Poland in the West, believing such a move would
project stability beyond Poland. NATO membership for Romania
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would also greatly reduce any potential danger from Bucharest, as
the Alliance would exert pressure on Romania both before and
after accession to resolve outstanding territorial and other
questions with Ukraine.
The private fears are of new dividing lines in Europe. Kiev
fears such lines, precisely because it is likely to find itself
on the wrong side of them. The Ukrainian leadership's strategic
nightmare is that expansion will spur renewed competition between
the West and Russia that will threaten Ukraine's benign external
environment and exacerbate Ukraine's internal divisions at
exactly the time when political and economic reforms are working
to close them. For a weak state, managing the consequences of
this post-expansion environment will be difficult enough.
However, if Russia takes more active measures to ensure that NATO
expansion does not intrude on its strategic space, Ukraine could
find itself fending off a whole series of Russian challenges to
its neutrality at precisely the moment the West has plenty of
reasons to remain aloof. NATO will have to absorb new members and
repair relations with Russia. The western debate over whether and
how to respond to Russia will take place before Ukraine has made
enough progress at home and in the minds of western diplomats and
publics to be seen unequivocally as part of Europe or at least as
crucial to Europe's future security and prosperity.
To maximize the potential benefits of NATO expansion and
mitigate its costs, Ukraine has adopted its current policy toward
expansion. This policy has four basic tenets:
1. NATO has a legitimate right to expand and the states of
Europe outside of Europe have a legitimate right to seek
membership in the Alliance. Ukraine has consciously taken a
friendlier approach to expansion than Russia, precisely because
it recognizes the right of the Alliance to seek new members. The
Ukrainian government has never publicly--or to my knowledge
privately--opposed NATO expansion. On the contrary, though
Ukraine has made many suggestions about the pace of expansion and
the structure of NATO forces in Central Europe, President Kuchma
and other senior officials have publicly underlined the positive
contribution NATO makes to the security of Europe. During his
June 1996 visit to Warsaw, Kuchma described NATO as "the only
real guarantor of security on the continent."7 Ukrainian
officials have little trouble understanding why Poland wants to
join the Alliance or seeing the benefits Poland will derive from
being inside Europe's greatest security Alliance. But another key
to Ukraine's strong expression of support for the legitimacy of
expansion is its interest in upholding the notion that "each
state has the right to decide itself on participation in any
international organization or bloc."8 Ukraine's interest in
noninterference by outside states in basic security decisions is
obvious.
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2. NATO expansion must not erode the security benefits of
the past decade. Ukraine wants to preserve its favorable external
environment. One of the most important ingredients in that
environment is the low level of military forces. There is simply
no country in the region, including Russia, that possesses a
military capable of large scale offensive action. The Russian
military is not currently capable of even regional power
projection to a demanding theater like Ukraine. Ukraine wants to
extend the current low levels of military force, of course, but
it also wants to preserve a security environment that encourages
future defense reform and modernization decisions in Russia and
elsewhere to respect the current conditions so favorable to
stability at low levels of military forces. Ukraine has been a
leader in speaking out against militarizing the NATO expansion
debate. In April 1996, Kuchma put forward a plan at the Moscow
Nuclear Summit for the creation of a Central European Nuclear
Weapons Free Zone as a way of ensuring that NATO expansion would
not radically alter existing military realities. Ukrainian
officials understand the formal acceptance of a zone of this type
is probably not in the cards, but they continue to press for
explicit assurances that a de facto zone of this type will emerge
in the region. Ukraine has also spoken out in favor of adapting
and modernizing the Treaty on Conventional Forces as a way of
securing its continued relevance. Ukraine does not want to see
the deployment of active combat units in the new NATO member
states (or in Belarus). It also urges the Alliance to go slow
even on what it understands are the legitimate tasks of
integration and military cooperation.
3. An expanded NATO and Europe as a whole has to reach a
fair accommodation with Russia, just as Russia must come to a
fair accommodation with NATO. Ukraine has often taken the role on
Russia's behalf that many in the West hope Russia would take for
itself, advocating a negotiated compromise that permits both NATO
expansion and a greater Russian role in Europe. As Kuchma stated
in the run-up to his June 1996 visit to Warsaw, "[Y]ou cannot
build a security system in Europe without Russia. Cooperation
with Russia is currently the largest challenge for Europe and the
world."9 Kuchma has spoken of the need to take "considerable
time" in the process of expansion so as to take into
"consideration Russia's views."10 Ukrainian officials are much
less suspicious than their Polish, Hungarian, and Czech
counterparts of a NATO-Russian Treaty or other agreement, though
they do not want a document that gives Russia the right to
restrict Ukrainian-NATO ties. They also have warned Moscow that
they regard the whole arsenal of military and economic
countermeasures in response to NATO expansion currently under
discussion as unnecessary and illegitimate. Ukraine does not view
an expanded NATO as a military threat. It will not participate in
Russian or CIS countermeasures or new military blocs.11 Ukraine's
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statements are part of its larger strategic aim of seeking
normalization with Russia and delegitimizing the threat or use of
military and economic intimidation in the Ukrainian-Russian
relationship. Kiev desperately wants the West to see and
understand the connection between NATO expansion and its
bilateral relationship with Moscow.
4. NATO and Ukraine must fashion their own special
relationship, including significant security cooperation. Ukraine
enthusiastically welcomed NATO's Partnership for Peace program in
1993, recognizing that such a program was ideally suited for a
country like Ukraine, which was neither in line for membership
nor demanding a special status that would differentiate it from
the other countries in Europe. Ukraine was the first CIS country
to seek participation in the program, and senior officials of the
ministries of defense and foreign affairs worked hard to prepare
an acceptable work plan. However, in mid-1995, the Ukrainian
leadership endorsed a policy of seeking a new level of
cooperation with the Alliance. Foreign Minister Udovenko led a
delegation of senior Ukrainian officials to Brussels in
September. A senior foreign ministry official defined Ukraine's
aim on the eve of this visit as trying to obtain "everything
short of Article V," i.e., everything short of an explicit
security guarantee.12 The Ukrainian delegation laid out ambitious
plans for cooperation with NATO during that trip. Ukraine set
aside what is for its military a large sum of money--$10 million-to finance its 1996 participation in the Partnership for Peace
program. It agreed to take part in special joint exercises under
the auspices of the NATO program and to allocate certain military
assets (mainly those already taking part in the Bosnia
peacekeeping mission) for future cooperative work with the
Alliance.13 Kiev has upgraded its representation in Brussels,
sending First Deputy Foreign Minister Tarasiuk to Brussels in
1995 as ambassador and former Defense Minister Konstantyn Morozov
in 1996 as a special military representative. Ukraine's ambitions
for cooperation, however, cannot be financed on its own. How far
Ukraine gets in implementing a more active relationship with NATO
will depend on Ukraine finding the budgetary resources for such
a relationship and on the Western Alliance and its members
recognizing the importance of this new relationship and lending a
helping hand. The United States, Poland, and other countries have
helped to support part of Ukraine's agenda financially, but there
are genuine fiscal and even internal political constraints on
large expenditures for such cooperation.
Taken together, the elements of Ukraine's NATO policy are
quite friendly to the Alliance and its plans. Ukraine's proposals
for restraint or changes to NATO assume a successful expansion.
Kuchma's proposals for a nuclear free zone for Central Europe
differ in legal form, but not in intent, from the Alliance's own
plans. Ukraine has expressed its anxieties about the potential
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costs of expansion, both for the region as a whole and for
Ukraine itself, privately. Expansion will complicate regional
security at a time when Ukraine is least able to manage any
complications at all. A good NATO-Ukrainian relationship, however
robust its provisions, could well give Ukraine little with which
to address the key internal challenges and be of little practical
significance in the quest to normalize ties with Moscow
(especially if NATO countries make no effort at all to encourage
the sides toward normalization of ties). A Ukrainian-NATO special
partnership will not automatically end much of Europe's
nonrecognition of Ukraine and its strategic significance. In
fact, for some European countries, NATO-Ukrainian ties might well
serve as justification for not expanding bilateral cooperation.
Ukraine, in this view, will have been adequately dealt with by
NATO alone.
So what does Ukraine expect to gain from its NATO policy?
Quite frankly, the Ukrainian leadership wants two things. The
first is that the policy advances the notion, particularly among
the most skeptical European states, of Ukraine as a part of
Europe, a contributor and not an obstacle to the expansion of key
European institutions. The second is more concrete. Ukraine wants
the expansion of the informal links that now define the U.S.Ukrainian and Ukrainian-NATO relationship and an increasing
demonstration of their impact upon the most pressing issues
facing Ukraine. The Ukrainian leadership has resigned itself to
the absence of treaties or other legally binding documents. It
knows that the United States is under no legal obligation to come
to its defense or even to intervene in Ukrainian-Russian
problems. It does want to create informal incentives for such an
intervention or even the sense of commitment and obligation. In
other words, it wants to be able to turn the promises, good
wishes and communique language it has received as an active
instrument of its policy. The benefit of the current ambiguity is
also its weakness. Ukraine intends to stretch the meaning of this
ambiguity in the direction of greater commitment; the United
States, NATO, and other of Ukraine's future partners are likely
to stretch it in the opposite direction. There is more than a
little chance for misunderstanding or surprise should a crisis
emerge that requires countries to take concrete action on the
basis of these ambiguous statements of support.
Conclusion.
There is not much that can be done in the immediate future
to resolve Ukraine's ambiguous status. Most of that work has to
be done by the Ukrainians themselves. They have to transform
their political and economic institutions to reduce, not widen,
the gap that now exists between Ukraine and the rest of Europe.
They have to resolve their outstanding difficulties with Russia.
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The best that can be hoped for is that Western leaders come to
understand Ukraine's strategic significance for the Europe-tocome and take corresponding steps to make sure that Ukraine
remains free to choose its own future, including a future of
closer ties to Europe.
For Ukraine, the main foreign policy priority is not its
relation with NATO. That relationship is part of a set of
strategic demands that encompass both internal and external
challenges. To address these challenges, Ukraine needs to broaden
its western policy, not concentrate it on NATO. Neither the West
nor Ukraine should place too much weight on the details of the
Ukrainian-NATO partnership or the language of the July
communique. These things matter, of course, but their real worth
will only be determined in the coming years. From this future
perspective, we will know whether they were part of a strategy
that deepened western engagement with Ukraine or were nothing but
hot air.
In the coming months, the West will be distracted by the
preparations for the July Summit and the completion and
ratification of the necessary agreements afterward. But, for an
expanded NATO, the real work of securing a stable and prosperous
Europe will have only begun. Most of the work that matters will
take place in the new borderlands of an expanded Alliance,
particularly Ukraine. NATO expansion implies expanded engagement
in these borderlands, not a period of withdrawal or focus on
internal Alliance issues. At a time when both new and old members
will want to celebrate the Alliance's accomplishments, the
pressing issue will be precisely to minimize the tension between
the broad expansion of the western space, understood as its
manner of doing business, and the more geographically limited
expansion of key western institutions.
The distinction between NATO members and non-members will
never be a trivial one, but it should not be allowed to become
the dominant security fact in Eastern and Central Europe. Ukraine
will be looking for more than reassurance in the months following
expansion, particularly if Russia chooses to respond to NATO
expansion by putting renewed pressure on Belarus and Ukraine
itself for closer economic and security ties. What the West can
offer in response is a broad-based policy that begins with
ensuring that the post-expansion processes within NATO are
transparent, communicated to nonmember states and supportive of
the current low levels of military force in the region. Kiev
will also want to see NATO continue its dialogue with Russia,
especially if no agreement with Moscow is reached before the July
Summit. However, that dialogue has to include both enticements
for greater Russian cooperation and firmness in the face of
Russian attempts to demarcate a sphere of its own.
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The specifics of a NATO-Ukrainian agreement must include
serious defense policy and planning matters. Ukraine faces
serious military reform hurdles in the coming years, and needs
help in designing an effective military that is trained and
deployed in a manner that builds upon the current low levels of
military confrontation in the region, especially with Russia. The
NATO-Ukrainian relationship has to be real work for the western
side, bringing into it a broad segment of the NATO bureaucracy.
In this way, it gives a large number of NATO diplomats
understanding of Ukraine's strategic significance and key
challenges. It also becomes a useful model for the Ukrainian
policy of individual member states and other European
institutions.
The most important sign of a successful post-expansion
Ukrainian policy will be found outside of NATO. There should be a
general post-expansion broadening of European interest in the new
borderlands, particularly Ukraine. Europe needs to expand its
role in internal Ukrainian political and economic reforms, and
should become an active supporter of Russian-Ukrainian
normalization. The U.S. and NATO may currently be leading the way
in Eastern and Central Europe, but it is time for individual
European states and other institutions to catch up.
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CHAPTER 5
NATO ENLARGEMENT AND SLOVAKIA
Ambassador Theodore E. Russell
This is a case study of a country where integration into
NATO and other Western organizations is heavily influenced by the
status of its democratic transformation process.
Drawing on my three previous tours of duty in the area, but
on a purely personal basis, I want to share with you some
thoughts about how NATO countries can help Slovakia qualify for
membership, how Slovakia can best qualify itself, assuming it
wishes to do so, and the policy we should take towards Slovakia
in the event it is not among the first countries invited by the
NATO summit in Madrid to begin negotiations for accession to the
Alliance.
In this analysis, I make several basic assumptions: The
first is that NATO enlargement, to include Central European
countries like Slovakia, is in our interest and is part of the
long-term, historic process of integrating Central European
countries into the Euro-Atlantic community. Since the days of the
Marshall Plan, the United States has been a strong supporter of
European integration. Countries seeking NATO membership, or even
closer partnership with NATO, have an incentive to move forward
with democratic and economic reforms and improve relations with
their neighbors. This incentive is particularly important in a
region like Central Europe, historically torn by ethnic and
territorial disputes. For example, interest in NATO membership
clearly encouraged Hungary and Slovakia and Hungary and Romania
to sign historic treaties guaranteeing respect for borders and
individual human rights. I believe the same can be said for the
recent Czech-German reconciliation accord.
Second, I am assuming that, as the December North Atlantic
Council meeting decided, the door to NATO enlargement will remain
open after one or more countries are invited at the July summit
to begin accession negotiations. The first new members will not
be the last. The Alliance will remain open to the accession of
future members and will pursue consultations with those nations
seeking NATO membership. The projected Atlantic Partnership
Council will be a further means of keeping up and enhancing a
cooperative relationship with applicants who may enter at a later
date.
And finally, the third assumption is that Slovakia's
prospects for more or less rapid integration into Western
organizations like NATO depend largely on the government of
Slovakia. Will it choose to institutionalize Western democratic
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practices and values and continue economic reform? The United
States wants independent Slovakia to succeed in these efforts and
will continue to encourage and help it to do so.
In her January 8, 1997, statement before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said
that "what NATO must and will do is keep open the door to
membership to every European nation that can shoulder Alliance
responsibilities and contribute to its goals, while building a
strong and enduring partnership with all of Europe's
democracies."
Only 3 years ago, Slovakia seemed as likely as other members
of the Visegrad group, including Poland, the Czech Republic and
Hungary, to be among the first Central European countries invited
to join NATO. Prime Minister Meciar had moved away from ideas he
had expressed earlier that Slovakia might follow a "third way"
between East and West, and appeared to believe that NATO was the
only viable security option for Slovakia in post-Cold War Central
Europe. A productive January 1994 summit meeting in Prague with
President Clinton and other Central European leaders appeared to
convince Prime Minister Meciar that the price for NATO admission
would not include recognition of so-called "collective rights"
for Slovakia's large Hungarian ethnic minority, although it would
require improved relations with Hungary and respect for
individual rights of members of ethnic minorities. The
Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, in which all Central
European countries had equal standing, perfectly suited the
Slovak aim of seeking group entry for the Visegrad states into
NATO at a measured pace designed not to offend the Russians.
Prime Minister Meciar's reaction to PfP was enthusiastic, and he
led Slovakia into the program in February 1994.
The short-lived Moravcik government, which came into power
in March 1994, moved energetically to strengthen Slovakia's
credentials for NATO and European Union (EU) membership. It
received kudos from Western partners and Japan, as well as from
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for its
reform efforts.
However, the third Meciar government, which came in after
the fall 1994 elections, has taken an increasingly ambivalent
line on the NATO enlargement issue. Although stating that NATO
membership remains a priority, the Prime Minister has been quoted
as criticizing unnamed NATO representatives for allegedly calling
for Slovakia to "give up (its) declarations to be a bridge
between East and West." He has generally dismissed as inaccurate
expressions of concern by prospective Western partners in NATO
and the EU about the pace of Slovakia's democratic reform. His
cabinet has approved opening a national debate on NATO
membership, and he has raised the idea of holding a popular
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referendum on the issue in May, even before the July NATO summit.
A recent poll showed that a majority of Slovaks who say they
would vote in such a referendum would vote in favor of NATO
membership, but that a majority in the Prime Minister's party are
opposed.
While making clear that the Slovak government must make its
own decisions, the State Department spokesman in early December
urged the Slovak cabinet to "commit to a higher degree of
internal reform." Thus, at a time of growing uncertainty about
Slovakia's attitude towards NATO enlargement, there is growing
concern being expressed by some of Slovakia's friends in the West
regarding its commitment to the domestic reforms necessary for
full integration into Western security and economic
organizations.
Let me now turn to what NATO should do and what Slovakia can
do if it so chooses to advance its prospects for NATO membership.
The United States and other NATO member countries can take a
number of actions which would advance Slovak NATO membership.
We should make clear to the Slovak government and public
that the United States and other NATO countries support
Slovakia's stated objective of integration into Western
organizations, including NATO and the EU. However, we are
concerned that Slovakia has not made as much progress in
democratic and market reform as some other countries in the area.
We are not trying to tell Slovakia that it must join NATO;
Slovakia obviously must make its own decisions. However, we are
pointing out that entry into NATO involves demonstrating that an
applicant country shares Western democratic values.
We must also make clear that establishing credentials for
membership in NATO and other Western organizations like the EU is
up to Slovakia. However, we should continue to speak frankly
about policies undercutting Slovakia's reform process which
jeopardize its integration into Western democratic organizations.
These policies include confrontational government attitudes
towards the media and constitutionally established judicial and
executive authorities, legislation undermining democratic
pluralism, including academic freedom, and lack of opportunity
for Parliamentary opposition parties to participate fully in the
oversight of sensitive government functions.
In the forthcoming public debate in Slovakia on NATO
membership, we should also try to clarify what NATO membership
does and does not actually entail. It does not aim to create new
divisions in Europe. Rather, Russia is recognized as a
fundamental part of a European security system and NATO and
Russia are engaged in an active dialogue on what their
relationship will be. In addition, as the December North Atlantic
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Council meeting made clear, NATO has no intention, plan, or
reason to station nuclear forces on the territory of new members.
NATO membership also does not mean that new members must
discard their existing military equipment in order to purchase
all new Western armaments, although they do need to move towards
interoperability with NATO forces. The Chairman of the NATO
Military Committee, Klaus Naumann, told Slovak news media, for
example, that Russian MIG-29 fighters in former Eastern Germany
fitted well into NATO integrated defense systems. He emphasized
that the priority issues for NATO involve solving problems of
language communication, a united command and Western standards
and procedures, rather than buying Western tanks or fighters.
We should continue to assist Slovakia with effective
military-to-military programs responding to the needs of the
Slovak armed forces to modernize communications, manage
resources, and upgrade language skills. And we should strengthen
political cooperation on a practical, everyday basis between
NATO and its PfP partners through the projected Atlantic
Partnership Council. We have had excellent relations with the
Slovak military and Slovakia has been a cooperative participant
in the PfP program.
We should also continue our effective technical assistance
programs designed to strengthen democratic pluralism, human
rights and market reform. The United States has already provided
over $200 million in this effort, including a successful program
to strengthen Slovak Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). And,
finally, we should remain engaged across the board, looking for
areas of common interest in foreign policy, but making clear that
compatibility of democratic values is fundamental to NATO
membership.
Let me now indicate some actions by the Slovak government
that would advance Slovakia's chances for NATO membership. I
believe the first and most essential step would be for the Slovak
leadership to determine whether NATO membership is a high
priority. Are they are willing to institutionalize those
democratic reforms and practices which will advance Slovakia's
integration into Western institutions? The government's attitude
now appears unclear. The Prime Minister's partners in the
governing coalition have been negative towards NATO in the past.
Government statements in reaction to Western expressions of
concern about the pace of Slovakia's internal reforms have
typically denied the basis for the criticism and blamed Slovak
opposition parties for creating an unfair image of Slovakia
abroad. These indicators imply that while the Slovak government
does not wish to be left behind its neighbors in entering NATO,
it seeks membership only on terms which do not jeopardize its
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domestic efforts to consolidate power.
I believe the Slovak government's political decisions with
respect to Slovakia's democratic transformation and economic
reform largely shape its foreign policy options. It is free to
choose its own course, just as NATO and EU member states are free
to choose their closest partners. The recent stripping of the
parliamentary mandate from a duly elected representative of the
Prime Minister's HZDS party, after he resigned from the party and
criticized the government for not fulfilling electoral promises
of democratic reform, raised serious questions among friends of
Slovakia about the government's commitment to reform. Similarly,
actions such as passage of legislation restricting academic
freedom and sharpening the penal code to permit tougher action
against critics have provoked criticism in Slovakia and abroad.
Having had occasion to raise some of these issues during my
service in Slovakia, I can tell you with confidence that the U.S.
position has been clear and consistent. We strongly support the
integration of a democratic Slovakia into the full range of
Western security and economic organizations for which it
qualifies. We will decide when and whether we will support
Slovakia's entry into NATO based on when and whether Slovakia
demonstrates that it fully shares NATO's democratic values. If
NATO membership is an operational priority, the governing
coalition will make clear by its actions that it favors rather
than fears democratic pluralism and respects the rights of
political and ethnic minorities.
Finally, the question arises: What if Slovakia chooses a
course which delays integration into NATO and other Western
structures? In this event, the Slovak government should be aware
that a policy of delay carries risks that Slovakia will not move
as rapidly as its neighbors into the full range of Western
economic and security structures. That said, however, it remains
in NATO's interest to continue to engage Slovakia in a
cooperative dialogue in the hope that, sooner rather than later,
its government will adopt a course permitting integration to move
forward.
NATO countries have no interest in isolating Slovakia and
every interest in its future success as a member of the Western
community of nations. NATO should hold the door open for possible
future Slovak membership once the government moves ahead
convincingly with democratic reform policies and makes clear that
Slovakia is willing to shoulder the responsibilities of
membership. NATO members should continue programs, including
military-to-military and technical assistance efforts, which
encourage those who are working to bring Slovakia into the
Western community of democratic nations.
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CHAPTER 6
NATO EXPANSION AND THE EUROPEAN NEUTRALS:
AUSTRIAN POSITIONS
Christian Clausen
The basic questions posed to the Austrian speaker at this
roundtable were:
• What is Austria doing with regard to those states that
will not enter NATO in the first tranche?
• What is Austria doing for itself as it ponders the
question of NATO membership?
These are two fundamentally different questions, and I will
therefore treat them separately.
Austria, not being a member of NATO, has no role to play in
the decisions of NATO inviting or not inviting several of
Austria's neighbors to join the Alliance. Austria enjoys however,
a special amount of trust and, of course, a historic and
geographic neighborhood with the prime candidates for NATO
membership; but also, based on the same facts, an equally close
relation with some of the countries who might, against their
aspirations, be passed over in the first round of invited
candidates. I will therefore concentrate on the Central European
region in my more specific comments.
In order to assess the situation properly, it might be
advantageous to outline the overall scenario in which European
security structures will develop in the near future. NATO
expansion and European Union (EU) expansion will move generally
in somehow parallel steps--the same group of countries which
might be the first to get into NATO, will also be the ones with
good chances to join the EU as new members. As there is no
immediate outside strategic military threat which would force an
acceleration of NATO enlargement, most security concerns of the
candidates are obviously more mid-to-long term. This will have
not only an impact on the diplomatic deliberations of the whole
process, but also on defense expenditures of all concerned--the
beneficiaries of a larger NATO, as well as existing members who
might be financial "benefactors" of the enlargement.
In a realistic assessment, spending money on NATO
integration is probably not, and will not presently be, the first
priority in any of the concerned states, both inside and outside
the Alliance, as long as there is no threat by an aggressor.
Reluctance of budget increases is one factor influencing
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popular opinion in Central European countries, but fear of the
stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory is also played
up by parties opposing NATO. This has led, even in a country as
progressive in its change as the Czech Republic, to a decrease of
popularity for NATO membership: having been well above 50 percent
in 1994, polls in December 1996 showed only about 40 percent
favor NATO candidacy.
Given the choice to spend budget money on entry requirements
to the EU or financing NATO demands, some of the serious
pretenders might choose economic and political needs first and
security structure spendings second, a pattern not unfamiliar
with older members of NATO. We all remember the NATO demand
during the 1980s for an annual 3 percent increase in national
defense spending, and the results in real figures that were then
seen. For most of the NATO candidates, necessary defense budget
increases would have to be fairly high to catch up with NATO
standards within a few years. If budgets cannot be increased
significantly in the new candidate countries, the integration
process will take proportionally longer. Hopes that massive
financial support from older members of NATO will be forthcoming
should be laid to rest, as most of the integration cost, if not
all, will have to be raised by the candidates themselves. An
example for this time/expenditure relation has recently been
published by the Polish government, outlining the assumption that
with a cost factor of a 4 percent increase of the defense budget,
Poland would have its defense restructuring finished not earlier
than by 2010, at a total cost of the accession estimated at $1.5
billion.1
Even under the most optimistic conditions and good budget
growth, the requirements for new members and the implementation
of structural modifications, as required before full "real"
membership, might take several years--and might not be completed
by 1999, notwithstanding all the changes already undertaken in
the "Partnership for Peace" (PfP). Such needs for adjustments are
nothing extraordinary as the history of NATO has shown with most
new members' integration in the past, both in terms of budget and
in time needed to implement changes.2
One could almost assume that the intervals between the first
and the second round of invitations to join NATO will be shorter
than the time it will take the first candidates to achieve full
compatibility with the Alliance and take over all the
responsibilities and obligations in the legal, financial,
infrastructural and logistic fields, from NATO Standardized
Agreements (STANAGS) to airspace coordination to language
proficiency to intelligence restructuring. That might very well
enable smaller, wealthier, and more flexible states of a later
round of accession to catch up or even pass larger but less adept
earlier candidates.
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One has the impression that there is now a mood of
artificial anxiety connected to this historic first expansion of
NATO into the realm of the former Warsaw Treaty Organization
(WTO). But in our pragmatic world of political reality, it will
not be a "big bang" situation--one day outside, next day a full
and privileged member. That was never the case in the past,
either. Presently missing is a calming-down effect on the
candidates and an emphasis on the time and money involved in this
process. This was highlighted very well in the RAND study on cost
of NATO enlargement, and again made clear very recently by
Secretary of Defense William Cohen, when he touched on this topic
during his Senate hearings in January:
. . . . If this is going to cost the United States
money--and it will--it's yet to be determined how much
cost will be involved . . . that's something that
requires . . . the approval of the Congress . . .3
As a noncompetitor for NATO membership at the present time,
Austria will not only be able to impartially interpret, if asked,
many of the factors mentioned above, but, together with the other
neutrals in Europe, Austria can also serve as an example of what
one might call the "selective approach" to a common European
security and Atlantic partnership. Austria has permanent
neutrality embedded in the constitution but has considered
military activities carried out under the provisions of a U.N.
Security Council decision as compatible with this neutrality.
This is also the legal basis for military contributions to
numerous U.N. missions during the last 40 years.
This experience in international military operations was an
excellent starting point for an active contributor role in the
PfP and has led to extensive involvement in bilateral training
events--several hundred every year--which are undertaken for the
benefit of most of our Central/Eastern European neighboring
countries, the same group of states now waiting for admission to
NATO.
Let us return to the question asked for this seminar: What
will Austria do for the countries that will not enter NATO in the
first tranche? If asked, Austria will explain its selective
approach. Austria will continue to do what we have done in the
past few years--work actively in the PfP (e.g., expand in civil
emergency planning, a field in which Austria is a main
contributor among the PfP countries, as NATO Secretary General
Solana stated recently), but Austria will also continue to field
a unit for the NATO operation in Bosnia; help to transit in- and
out-traffic of NATO troops to Bosnia; and participate in the
"cooperative" series of PfP exercises in Europe and the United
States.
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Austria is looking forward to participating in the future
"PfP-plus" but will also carry on with all the multiple military
missions in the service of the United Nations. The recent forming
of a combined Austrian-Hungarian peacekeeping contingent in the
U.N. peacekeeping force in Cyprus is an example of how these two
fields can be brought together.
Why is all that mentioned here? Because it shows how much
countries can do in the spirit of creating collective European
security, even if some of them have no aspirations to join NATO
at the present time. Most of the activities mentioned can be
undertaken by any country that wants to do so, including the
states not invited to join the first group of NATO candidates-and they would find themselves in rather good company indeed,
because this is generally the profile of all the neutrals of
Europe.
A "selective approach," or choosing one's priorities, has
economic integration and security integration as equal
priorities, keeping ambitions in line with the budget and with
the chances that offer themselves over time. Fortunately, such a
priority selection between the two main pillars of Europe's
future development--symbolized by NATO/Western European Union
(WEU) on the one hand, and the EU on the other--does not close
any doors. Let me again quote Secretary Cohen, who is, without a
doubt, a dominant voice in NATO. He commented on the sequence of
invitations to join the Atlantic Alliance at his Senate hearings
as follows:
. . .
first
case.
there

. Some country will say we didn't get invited the
time; therefore, we're out. But that's not the
It should be made clear this is the first time;
will be second and third entries . . . 4

In the years since the end of bipolar confrontation in
Europe, Austria has decided that its main priority lies in
economic and political integration into the EU and that the
defense and military integration would have to evolve thereafter.
This does not mean that Austria abstained in any way from a
constructive engagement: Vienna has been the seat of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and is
now the main arena for the Organization on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) which evolved from that conference.
As a matter of fact, one of the basic agreements for the end of
the Cold War, the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE),
was not only negotiated in Vienna, but the first conference for
revision of this treaty has started in Austria. This is, as we
all know, one of the crucial prerequisites to improve the
attitude of Russia toward the expansion of NATO.
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The course of action charted by the Austrian government is
not a very complicated one and builds on the active contributions
made earlier. One of the key fora which will set the stage in
European security and in which Austria is fully participating is
the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on the Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP). Austria intends to formulate its
relations with the WEU in accordance with the final
recommendations of the IGC, which will conclude its deliberations
in June 1997 in Amsterdam. This will be a guideline for relations
with NATO in the next few years. Likewise, it is going to confirm
Austria's position in the CFSP--fittingly abbreviated in German
with the acronym, "GASP." These steps need to be made before
Austria takes its turn at the presidency of the EU in 1998, so
there is a rather firm timetable by now for progress towards
European security structures.
Neutrality is still an issue which will have to be resolved
in a formal procedure. To enable a more harmonious transition
from permanent neutrality to future collective commitments,
membership in the WEU has a special meaning for the Vienna
government. That a good measure of flexibility exists has been
shown by military participation in the IFOR and SFOR operations,
by the acceptance of the Maastricht principles, and by Austria's
readiness to share Petersburg obligations which require military
means.
Answers to questions on the future of NATO and on its
membership invariably include aspects which have something to do
with the EU. The candidates for this structure are mostly the
same as the ones for NATO. The EU is increasing its involvement
in security policy: the Maastricht Agreement, the IGC, and the
debate about the future relationship of WEU and EU in defense
matters, just to name the most important factors of this
interrelation. The recent threat of NATO member Turkey to block
the NATO admission of Central European candidates into NATO as
long as Turkey itself is not admitted into the EU is a most
illustrative example of how both sets of admission procedures are
becoming related.5
Aspiring candidates for NATO membership who are not sure
about their chances to be invited at an early stage should
therefore promote their admission with both goals in mind,
remembering that progress on one track might almost automatically
better the chances for an entry into the other structure as well.
This, however, might work both ways: being found ineligible for
NATO can possibly have a detrimental effect on EU admission, and
vice versa.
Although it might appear that NATO and EU are firmly set
with clearly defined strategic aims and in their philosophy as
homogenous bodies, reality shows that this is not so, and that,
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as a matter of fact, there have always been "gray zones" in their
respective structures. Military participation of France in NATO
over the years is one example, and the long and gradual process
of integrating Iberian NATO members is another.
In the EU, we can also see this phenomenon of existing
possibilities to "opt out"--existing not only in the past, like
Great Britain's refusal to join the social policy part of the
Maastricht Treaty, while also approaching the EU in a dramatic
way in the near future. With the coming introduction of a common
European currency, some members will join right away, but there
will be a second group of members who do not want or cannot join
in this fundamental step into the future for the time being.
There is as yet no appropriate designator for the pragmatic
existence of gray zones or concentric developments, which are
more likely to increase in the future rather than to be overcome
by clearcut, black-white characteristics in EU and NATO. For the
new candidates, this ought to be an element of relief that, if
not taken in now, this does not mean that the gate will remain
closed forever--even for the ones who still have not met all of
the admission criteria. Most likely this will lead to more
differentiated memberships, like "PfP-plus" or de facto
associated members of NATO, who have all in common with the
Alliance except nuclear guarantees, or members who make it known
that they will opt out of NATO operations in certain areas, or
participants in combined joint task force operations who have not
initiated admission negotiations with NATO. In his opening
statement Ambassador David Abshire recalled that, for years
during the Cold War, some of the European neutrals were "under
the nuclear umbrella" of NATO, although they never desired NATO
membership at that time. Gray zones have existed in the past and
most probably will always be found in these overlapping
structures of NATO and EU.
Threat perceptions for Europe need to be defined for the
years to come. There is still a lot to be done to make the
picture clearer and to show for what types of threats NATO is
supposed to provide defenses in the future. Presently, we can see
some contours developing, like the increase in threats from
terrorism and illegal immigration, electronic and information
warfare scenarios, and, at the same time, a decrease in
probability of the historic security threats for Europe, like
large-scale armored offensives across Central Europe or massive
strategic nuclear missile strikes. But it is not only the
Alliance on the whole that must change, the new candidates should
also adjust their own particular threat perceptions and assess
their "wish lists" for NATO membership accordingly. This will, at
the same time, make it easier to define what nations must do to
come up with their own share of defense efforts in order to
qualify for NATO assistance. Again, the RAND study on the cost of
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expansion is a good guideline for a start. How much remains to be
done in this process of revising old cliches becomes obvious in
higher level PfP contacts and in many bilateral staff exercises
with neighbors of Austria who aspire to early NATO membership.
In summarizing these observations, we should return to the
two questions at the start of our overview:
• What to say to the countries of Central Eastern Europe not
in the first tranche of NATO expansion?
• How will Austria itself proceed with its steps toward a
common Atlantic and European security?
Nothing could better form a guideline for an answer to both of
these two questions than one of the key statements of the
European presidency on security policy developments formulated in
1995:
The positive effects on European security . . . .
Should be brought about by an eventual broad congruence
of membership in EU, WEU, and NATO, taking into account
the need for flexibility and the differing membership
requirements.6
Or in very simple terms:
Go for a selective approach--take your time, don't be
jealous, and, for Heaven's sake, don't panic!
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